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Abstract 
   The Second Shenandoah Valley Campaign in 1864 created new challenges for 
commanders, soldiers, and civilians on both sides.  Pressure on General Grant and 
President Lincoln to end the war quickly precipitated an increase in the use and severity 
of hard war policies in the South.  Meanwhile, Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal 
Early worked against his foe, implementing hard war in southern Pennsylvania in a 
desperate attempt to maintain his supply base in the Shenandoah Valley.  Soldiers and 
civilians found themselves caught in the middle of an increasing cycle of destruction that 
they seemed to find equally demoralizing. 
Three towns suffered significant damage resulting from hard war tactics between 
June and October 1864:  Lexington and Dayton, Virginia, and Chambersburg, 
Pennsylvania.  Together, raids in these three locales reveal the changing nature of the war 
in regard to private property and the effect new policies had on soldier and civilian 
morale.  In each town that summer and fall of 1864, commanders and enlisted men 
exercised restraint in the midst of destruction.  Often, men from both sides had been 
involved in or witnessed more than one of these raids, contributing to the effectiveness of 
these incidents as case studies.   
To say that the level of destruction steadily increased from June to October would 
be an oversimplification.  Yet the destruction did seem to become less discriminate and 
more widespread as the campaign progressed.  Concurrently, the level of distress soldiers 
and civilians expressed also increased with each incident, prompting soldiers to go to new 
lengths in circumventing orders to spare private property.  Each instance was sparked by 
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some sentiment of retaliation, and causal relationships existed among all three.  In every 
instance, without fail, the men and civilians caught in the middle expressed profound 
regret.  Both sides decided that hard war had limits.    
  
 
 
Introduction 
 By the time the Second Shenandoah Valley Campaign began in May 1864, the 
American Civil War had taken a drastic turn.  President Abraham Lincoln faced a 
contentious re-election campaign, and though Union troops in the West had scored 
important strategic victories on the battlefield, General Robert E. Lee and the Army of 
Northern Virginia managed to persevere in the East.  Confederate troops continued to 
protect their capital in Richmond and threatened Washington, DC in a series of raids 
based out of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia.  Weary of the fighting that had pervaded 
his entire term as president, Lincoln wanted and needed a decisive victory in the East to 
win the war—and the 1864 presidential election.  Poor leadership and disappointing 
generals had plagued the Union Army in the East, and by the spring of 1864, Lincoln 
appointed a bold general with a winning record in the West and a reputation for ruthless 
tactics:  Ulysses S. Grant. 
 Grant’s promotion signaled a shift in Union war policy.  Historian Mark Grimsley 
has identified a change from the early policy of “conciliation” to one of “hard war.”  
Where conciliation had initially intended to facilitate the Confederacy’s reentry into the 
United States, the new hard war policy targeted supplies and resources--even those 
belonging to civilians—in an attempt to erode resistance and destroy the ability to wage 
war.  Grimsley writes of the Union policy, “The hard hand of war descended most 
heavily on public property and the property of private persons who supported the 
Confederacy, especially the wealthy.”1  Grimsley’s definition encompasses “operations 
                                               
1 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 4.    
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aimed at the destruction of enemy economic resources (whether publicly or privately 
owned), forced evacuations, or confiscation of property without recompense” with “one 
common element:  the erosion of the enemy’s will to resist by deliberately or 
concomitantly subjecting the civilian population to the pressures of war.”2   
 Grant articulated this strategic shift to Lincoln in the spring of 1864, just before 
the Spring Campaign opened.  Grant explained that Union troops should advance on 
Confederate lines in order to “compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, 
or else lay his own territory open to invasion.”  Lincoln understood and replied, “’Oh, 
yes!  I see that.  As we say out West, if a man can’t skin he must hold a leg while 
somebody else does.’”3  Yet, despite the increased level of destruction that hard war 
brought, both sides exercised a level of restraint and placed limits on the amount of 
destruction.  In some cases, the limits were geographic, and in other instances, particular 
homes and buildings were either targeted or spared by commanding officers.  Destruction 
was far from universal even under this new “hard war.” 
Three small towns serve as case studies for hard war in the 1864 Valley 
Campaign:  Lexington and Dayton, Virginia and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.  All three 
became targets of enemy troops, and all were objects of retaliation.  These towns provide 
a particularly interesting study because of their geographic and chronological 
proximity—they lie within two hundred miles of each other, and all experienced the 
destruction of large amounts of civilian property between June and October 1864.  In 
                                               
2 Grimsley, 5. 
3
 Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (1885; repr., New York: Dover Publications, 1995), 282. 
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addition, many officers and enlisted men from both armies were involved in at least two 
of the three events or became witnesses immediately after the fact. 
 These three case studies taken together reveal that enlisted men were generally no 
more comfortable carrying out the destruction by October 1864 than they had been in 
June, even though the orders to destroy became more severe as time went on.  Union and 
Confederate soldiers alike struggled with the ambivalence of bringing the war “home” to 
enemy civilians while maintaining their Victorian values.  Soldiers on both sides wanted 
to end the war quickly, yet their commanders’ new policies of increased destruction often 
seemed at odds with their own standards of “civilized” warfare.  The fact that these 
soldiers had left behind wives, daughters, mothers, and sisters who were themselves 
vulnerable to invading armies further complicated their thoughts and feelings about the 
burnings.  Many soldiers on the front line of destruction struggled to carry out such 
orders when they came face to face with women who looked and sounded like the women 
they had left behind.  Reports of men on both sides who disobeyed orders and fabricated 
excuses not to destroy private property abounded. 
 The issues of destruction and soldierly duty are discussed not only in Grimsley’s 
work, but also in Charles Royster’s The Destructive War, which looks at the increased 
level of destruction inaugurated by the war.  Royster describes the American Civil War as 
the first truly modern war and argues that Americans accepted and expected a greater 
level of destruction in this war than they had in previous conflicts.  Grimsley, on the other 
hand, clearly defines the concept of “hard war” as the regulated, limited destruction of 
private property—as opposed to “total war” which he defines as indiscriminate 
destruction.   
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 While Royster and Grimsley deal with the big picture, other works focus on either 
soldiers or civilians exclusively.  Gerald Linderman’s Embattled Courage describes how 
the character of the war changed for combat soldiers, especially Union soldiers, in the last 
two years of the war, with the rising death toll and the increased destruction of private 
property.  Similarly, Reid Mitchell’s examination of the northern soldier in The Vacant 
Chair demonstrates how physical distance from family and community psychologically 
distanced Union soldiers from their hometown values and allowed them to confront 
civilians in ways that were previously unacceptable.  Both works demonstrate how the 
increasing level of death and destruction toward the end of the war exerted stress on 
soldiers’ Victorian values and how the soldiers eventually adopted a new set of mores to 
deal with the orders they received to destroy private property and to turn women and 
children out of their homes. 
 From the civilian perspective, Seasons of War by Daniel E. Sutherland provides 
an up-close examination of one community, Culpeper County, Virginia, as it continually 
changed hands between the Union and Confederate armies.  Sutherland argues that 
occupation eroded southern nationalism and that total war—he differs from Grimsley 
over the degree of destruction—was effective in ultimately wearing down southern 
resistance.  Megan Kate Nelson contributed to the field recently with Ruin Nation, 
published in 2012.  While Nelson largely deals with historical memory and the ways in 
which the war’s ruins were memorialized or repurposed, she also examines the 
destruction of civilian homes in the latter stages of the war and how the war’s new 
technology increased the capacity for destruction, arguing that Americans became 
increasingly desensitized to destruction as it became more frequent.  The important 
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question that remains is to what extent northern occupation and destruction dissolved 
southerners’ will to continue fighting. 
 Military histories of the 1864 Valley Campaign are essential to understanding the 
context in which the burnings occurred.  Richard R. Duncan’s Lee’s Endangered Left 
covers the campaign in depth, focusing on the last major push in western Virginia and the 
larger campaign in which all of the 1864 burnings transpired.  Duncan describes the 
actions by the commanders on both sides and sheds light on their military objectives and 
how the towns that were damaged figured into the broader goals of the armies.  William 
G. Thomas’ essay “Nothing Ought to Astonish Us,” describes the changing policy on 
civilian property throughout the Valley Campaign.  He focuses on the impact of 
destruction on the southern homefront, though he does explore the connections between 
events in Lexington and Chambersburg.  Thomas concludes with Sheridan’s raid but 
ignores the burning of Dayton.  The short length of the essay precludes an in-depth 
examination of the burnings, but it does provide a good starting point for viewing the 
burnings as a sequence of related events, and it demonstrates the increasing scale of 
destruction. 
 In-depth studies of the destruction in Lexington, Chambersburg, and Dayton lack 
scholarly research and are limited to local histories written by amateur historians, often at 
the behest of county historical societies.   While they are rich in narrative and 
bibliographic information, they are often overly patriotic in tone, celebrating their towns’ 
history and heritage, as well as their rebirth after destruction.  The major work that deals 
with Lexington is Robert J. Driver, Jr.’s Lexington and Rockbridge County in the Civil 
War.  Driver’s work provides invaluable details regarding the occupation and destruction 
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in the Lexington area and in greater depth than the broader scholarly works do.  
Likewise, Chambersburg’s destruction is detailed in two locally-published works, 
Southern Revenge! by Ted Alexander and Confederate Retaliation, written by Fritz 
Haselberger.  Like Driver’s work, these two books offer valuable bibliographic resources 
as well as details on precisely which properties were destroyed, information that is 
difficult to locate in other places.  Rockingham County native John L. Heatwole penned 
The Burning, which tells not only the story of Dayton’s burning in October 1864, but also 
that of the surrounding area in the larger campaign that Union General Philip Sheridan 
conducted as part of the Union’s new hard war policy.  Like his counterparts in 
Chambersburg and Lexington, Heatwole unearths important local sources, including 
many oral histories he collected himself.  However, his research requires careful 
consideration, as it relies heavily on oral tradition that bears a striking resemblance to 
folklore, and he neglected some important sources that tell the full story of the burning.  
Simply put, the local histories cannot be taken at face value, but they also cannot be 
overlooked entirely. 
Civilian property and the question of how each army should deal with it became 
an increasingly divisive issue as the Civil War dragged on.  Historians have addressed the 
burnings of 1864 from a variety of angles, but there is still a major gap in the research in 
that it fails to address these three incidents holistically, from the soldiers’ and civilians’ 
perspectives.  Fitting together the various pieces of this puzzle will yield a greater 
understanding of how decisions to destroy private property were made and how the 
destruction impacted the course of the war.  Important questions emerge from taking 
these three towns together as a case study:  Why were these three towns singled out and 
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why at this particular time?  What were the limits of destruction and why were there 
limits?  How did the burnings affect civilian morale?  How did the soldiers involved feel 
about the orders to destroy property?  These questions hold significance beyond the 
summer of 1864.  Shortly after the destruction in Dayton in October, Union General 
Sheridan completed a widespread hard war policy in the Shenandoah Valley, followed by 
General Sherman’s March to the Sea later that year in Georgia and South Carolina, which 
many credit with hastening the war’s end. 
Beginning with the Battle of New Market in May 1864 and concluding with the 
Battle of Cedar Creek in October 1864, the Second Valley Campaign was fought not only 
on the battlefield but also on the farms and in the small towns of Virginia, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania.  In the cases of Lexington, Chambersburg, and Dayton, commanders 
decided to order destruction as a form of retaliation against the enemy.  And in each case, 
common soldiers and officers exercised restraint in the destruction, whether they believed 
the burning was necessary or not.  A cycle of retaliation with restraint ensued.
  
 
 
Chapter 1: Hunter’s Raid on Lexington 
  In May 1864, the war in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley entered a new phase.  In 
the first Valley Campaign of 1862, the region became a battleground because of its 
proximity to both Washington and Richmond and because the mountains that ran along 
its borders provided a shield for Confederate General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson to 
harass Union troops intent on capturing Richmond.  Two years later, Union troops 
refocused their attention on the Valley and went farther south in the region than they ever 
had before.  The Valley once again occupied a strategic position, but this time, 
agricultural production, not geographic location, was the objective.  The Valley earned its 
nickname the “Breadbasket of the Confederacy” for the large quantities of grain it 
provided for southern soldiers and civilians alike, and Union commanders showed a new 
determination to prevent the region from continuing to feed the enemy by controlling or 
destroying its supplies and transportation lines. 
 The second Valley Campaign opened on May 15, 1864 at the Battle of New 
Market.  Cadets from Virginia Military Institute marched eighty-one miles from 
Lexington north to New Market to acts as reserves for Confederate General John C. 
Breckinridge as his men battled Union General Franz Sigel along the Great Valley Road.  
This was Sigel’s second round in the Shenandoah Valley; he was part of the Union force 
that Jackson had defeated in the 1862 Valley Campaign.  Many considered Sigel inept, 
but his German background endeared him to Union soldiers of German descent, and 
President Lincoln gave him command of the new Department of West Virginia. 
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After several hours of fighting, Sigel’s troops were pushed back to the northern 
edge of the Valley.  The two hundred fifty-seven cadets who fought in the battle served 
admirably by all accounts under Commandant of Cadets, Lieutenant Colonel Scott Shipp.  
Shipp’s official report elaborated, “The Cadets did their duty, as the long list of casualties 
will attest. . . . Wet, hungry. . . they bore their hardships with that uncomplaining 
resignation which characterizes the true soldier.”4  The cadets counted ten dead and fifty-
seven wounded among their unit at the conclusion of the battle and returned to the 
Institute in Lexington as their Confederate comrades headed east to join Confederate 
General Robert E. Lee’s army.  Meanwhile, Sigel withdrew north near Cedar Creek and 
was quickly replaced by Union General David Hunter.  Days after Sigel’s embarrassing 
rout at New Market, a frustrated Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant wrote to Major 
General Henry Halleck, “By all means I would say appoint General Hunter, or anyone 
else, to the command of West Virginia.”5  Hunter had already made a name for himself in 
the war and was dubbed “Black Dave” for his abolitionist views.  In 1862, Hunter had 
issued “General Order No. 11,” ordering the emancipation of slaves in three Confederate 
states; in response, Confederate President Jefferson Davis officially branded Hunter an 
outlaw and authorized his execution if captured.
6
  Hunter’s reputation preceded him in 
the Shenandoah Valley.  
                                               
4 S. Shipp to Maj. Gen. F. H. Smith, July 4, 1864, U.S. War Department, War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, vol. 37, pt. I: 91.  Cited hereafter as OR; unless 
otherwise specified, all OR documents are located in Series I. 
5 Grant to Halleck, May 19, 1864, OR, 37, pt. I: 492. 
6 Davis’ order regarding Hunter can be found in “General Orders, No. 60,” August 21, 1862, OR, Series III, 
vol. 5: 712.  
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Hunter reorganized Sigel’s troops and began marching south.  Grant authorized 
the troops to “liv[e] on the country,”7 to which Hunter replied, “I shall depend entirely on 
the country.”8  However, Hunter himself revealed a measure of restraint in General Order 
No. 29, which he handed down immediately following his promotion and just before his 
army began their march south: 
Commanders will be held strictly responsible that their commands are 
amply supplied from the country.  Cattle, sheep, and hogs, and if 
necessary horses and mules, must be taken and slaughtered.  These 
supplies will be seized under the direction of officers duly authorized, and 
upon a system which will hereafter be regulated.  No straggling or 
pillaging will be allowed. . . . They [commanders] will see that in passing 
through a country in this way, depending upon it for forage and supplies, 
great additional vigilance is required on the part of every officer in 
command of men for the strict enforcement of discipline.
9
 
Charles H. Lynch of the 18
th
 Connecticut indicated that Hunter was true to his word:   
Owing to our rations running very low some of the boys took the liberty to 
go foraging, going without a permit from the General's headquarters. They 
were rounded up by cavalry scouts, placed under arrest, taken to 
headquarters, where they received a severe reprimand from General 
Hunter. All were punished. 
The soldiers did not understand the reason behind Hunter’s strict orders not to seek out 
their own food when rations were low.  Lynch elaborated, “We can stand most anything 
but hunger.  It did seem very strange to us that we could not forage in the enemy's 
country.  We are seventy miles from our base of supplies, which must be brought to us in 
wagons under a strong guard.” 10  Hunter issued the orders to control his troops rather than 
                                               
7 Grant to Halleck, May 25, 1864, OR, 37, pt. I: 536. 
8 Hunter to Halleck, May 28, 1864, OR, 37, pt. I: 548. 
9 General Order No. 29, May 22, 1864, OR 37, pt. I: 518. 
10 The Civil War Diary, 1862-1865, of Charles H. Lynch, 18th Conn. Vol's, Alexander Street,  
http://solomon.cwld. alexanderstreet.com /cgi-in/asp/philo/cwld/documentidx.pl?sourceid=S1631 (accessed 
October 7, 2012). 
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to protect private property; he proved quick to punish civilians, as he burned houses from 
which guerrillas fired on Union troops.
11
  
 
 
As he moved south, Hunter defeated a small Confederate force at the Battle of 
Piedmont on June 5.  The following day, Grant ordered Hunter to move on Lynchburg to 
destroy the Virginia Central Railroad, suggesting “it would be of great value to us to get 
possession of Lynchburg for a single day,” but also adding that Confederate resistance 
would likely render that goal impossible.
12
  Lynchburg served as a major supply base for 
the Confederacy, and its intricate transportation network of canals, rivers, and railroads 
made it an inviting target for the Union and the object of fierce protection by the 
Confederacy. 
On the way to Lynchburg, Hunter arrived in Staunton, in the southern 
Shenandoah Valley.  The war had come within thirty miles of the city, but Union troops 
had never entered the city itself; Staunton was one of several Virginia towns that would 
see direct action for the first time during Hunter’s Raid.  In Staunton, Hunter discovered 
“large quantities of commissary and ordnance stores, which were destroyed or distributed 
among the troops.  All the railroad bridges and depots, and public workshops and 
factories in the town and vicinity, were also destroyed.”13  In many ways, events in 
Staunton provided the blueprint for future raids by Hunter’s men.  They destroyed nearly 
all public property and left private property largely untouched. 
                                               
11 Frank Smith Reader Diary, May 26, 1864, Hunter’s Raid File.  Top government and military authorities 
in the United States sanctioned the destruction of homes harboring guerrillas, and many Union generals, 
including Ulysses S. Grant, practiced this form of punishment.  Hunter’s actions in this regard were not out 
of the ordinary. 
12 Grant to Hunter, June 6, 1864, OR, 37, pt. I: 598. 
13
 Hunter, June 8, 1864, OR, 37, pt. I: 95. 
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Pressing on toward Lynchburg, Hunter pursued Confederate troops under 
Generals John McCausland and William L. “Mudwall” Jackson as they retreated south.  
The two armies encountered each other again on June 11, just outside Lexington.  
McCausland had strong ties to Lexington’s Virginia Military Institute:  he graduated first 
in the Class of 1857, served as assistant professor of math and tactics and, as a faculty 
member, had escorted cadets to John Brown’s 1859 execution in Charles Town.14  
McCausland’s orders that day did not include defending the town.  Instead, he was 
ordered to perform a delaying action in Lexington, buying time for General Jubal Early to 
reinforce the more valuable city of Lynchburg and keep it out of Union hands.   
In his official report, Hunter expressed contempt for McCausland’s tactics, 
describing his concealment of artillery inside the town as an “unsoldierly and inhuman 
attempt. . . to defend an indefensible position against an overwhelming force by screening 
himself behind the private dwellings of women and children.”  McCausland, in fact, may 
have intentionally put the townspeople in harm’s way, drawing Union artillery fire on 
civilians to provoke outrage in the southern press, and at least one Lexington civilian 
agreed with Hunter’s assessment.  Cornelia Peake McDonald, a Winchester soldier’s wife 
who took refuge in Lexington, commented on the event in her memoirs:  “June 11th, the 
approach of the enemy was announced.  Everybody connected with the army prepared to 
fly.  Gen. Smith departed with the corps of cadets, and Gen. McCausland after burning 
the bridge that led to the town, made good his retreat, leaving the terror-stricken people to 
                                               
14 Virginia Military Institute’s website contains valuable information on the school’s Civil War history.  For 
a brief biographical sketch of McCausland, see Virginia Military Institute, “VMI’s Civil War Generals,” 
http://www.vmi. edu/ archives.aspx?id=5627 (accessed January 18, 2013). 
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their fears, and to the tender mercies of the enemy.”15  Hunter went on to explain that this 
action, along with the presence of Confederate sharpshooters in the cliffs and nearby 
buildings “might have brought justifiable destruction upon the whole town, but as this 
was not rendered imperative by any military necessity, I preferred to spare private 
property and an unarmed population.”16   
The Union Army may not have considered the small town of Lexington a 
strategic target of any significance, but the Army of West Virginia had a bone to pick 
with one of its educational institutions.  Virginia Military Institute had long been a thorn 
in the Union’s side, and though the Institute’s cadets played only a small role in the New 
Market debacle, the school had served as a breeding ground for secession and 
Confederate indoctrination, not to mention the fact that “Stonewall” Jackson had 
famously taught there prior to the war.  Both sides identified the school as a beacon of 
southern values; the Battle of New Market had merely raised the stakes.  Reporting on the 
battle in May, the Lynchburg Virginian lauded the cadets’ role in the victory and the 
Institute in general:  “Well may Virginians point to it as one of the most sightly and 
enduring monuments of her splendid magnificence, to be cherished and adorned in all 
future time.  There has been scarcely a field won by Southern valor and prowess where 
her graduates have not led [troops] . . . and but few that have not been wet with their 
blood.”17  The state of Virginia owned VMI and was in open rebellion against the United 
States government, yet Hunter did not begin the task of destroying it until the day after 
his troops arrived in Lexington. 
                                               
15 Cornelia McDonald, A Diary with Reminiscences of the War and a Refugee Life in the Shenandoah 
Valley, 1860-1865 (Nashville: Cullom and Ghertner, 1934), 202-203. 
16 Hunter, August 8, 1864, OR, 37, pt. I: 96. 
17
 “The Virginia Military Institute,” Lynchburg Virginian, May 23, 1864. 
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 As townspeople received word of Hunter’s approach and began hearing artillery 
and small arms fire, they instinctively knew that their beloved Institute would not likely 
survive the raid intact.  Diarist Margaret Junkin Preston left behind one of the most 
detailed and insightful accounts of Hunter’s Raid, and she held a unique position in 
Lexington society and history.  Her father, Reverend George Junkin, had served as 
president of Washington College in Lexington but had retired amid controversy over his 
unionist views and left the state.  Preston’s husband, John Thomas Lewis Preston, was 
one of VMI’s founders, and her late sister Eleanor was the first wife of then VMI 
professor “Stonewall” Jackson.18  As early as June 7, Preston recorded, “Mr. P. [her 
husband] is as busy as he can be, getting things at the V. M. I. moved away. The library 
has been carried to [Washington] College. As the Institute is Government property, they 
will most likely burn it; that, at all events, is what we apprehend.”19  A later report to the 
Board of Trustees of Washington College confirmed that  
a considerable number of pieces of apparatus from the V. M. Institute had 
been deposited [in one of the college’s laboratories] for safe keeping, 
under the belief, that if any place would escape the depredations of an 
invading foe, it would be a purely scientific establishment, which could 
have but little bearing upon the war, either directly or indirectly.
20
   
The fact that items from VMI were relocated to the adjacent Washington College 
indicates that residents also believed the school would be spared destruction. 
 The townspeople’s predictions proved eerily accurate.  Though Washington 
College did not escape vandalism entirely, it was spared the torch while VMI was not.  
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Union soldiers delighted in the destruction of the Institute, which, to them, represented 
Confederate values and southern aristocracy.  Colonel David Hunter Strother of the 3
rd
 
West Virginia Cavalry, first cousin to General David Hunter and the general’s chief of 
staff, concurred with the prevailing northern view.  Strother was popularly known as 
“Porte Crayon” or “Pencil Carrier,” the pen name he used as an artist for Harper’s 
Weekly and various other publications before the war.  He was born in western Virginia 
but spent much of his adult life outside the South, and his unionist views eventually led 
him to join the Union Army.
21
  Strother’s diary entry for June 12 reveals the soldiers’ 
attitudes:   
The General asked my opinion in regard to the destruction of the Institute.  
I told him I looked upon it as a most dangerous establishment where 
treason was systematically taught.  That I believed the States Rights 
conspirators had with subtlety and forethought established and encouraged 
the school for the express purpose of educating the youth of the country 
into such opinions as would render them ready and efficient tools 
wherewith to overthrow the government of the country when the hour and 
opportunity arrived. . . . The catalogue of the Institute itself showed what a 
list of capable military officers had been there raised up against the 
government of the country.  This was the great paramount reason for its 
destruction by fire.  There were military reasons besides.  The professors 
and cadets had taken the field against government troops, as an organized 
corps.
22
     
Strother’s justification for burning VMI included both its secessionist reputation as well 
as a desire to retaliate against the school for its participation in the Battle of New Market. 
One Pennsylvania soldier expressed a twinge of regret, writing home, “There was 
a military school here but we have burnt all the buildings. It was a pitty [sic] to do it but I 
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suppose it could not be helpt [sic].”23  Other accounts of the raid indicate that the burning 
of the Institute was a foregone conclusion.  The day before VMI was burned, Frank 
Smith Reader of the West Virginia 5
th
 Cavalry wrote simply, “At this place is the Va. 
Mil. Institute which we will burn.”24  William H. Beach of the First New York Cavalry 
echoed his comrades’ thoughts:   
The young cadets of the Lexington Military Institute had borne a part in 
the battle of New Market.  From a professorship in this Institute Stonewall 
Jackson had entered the Confederate service.  Hunter ordered the Institute 
to be burned.  He stood looking at the burning building, saying as he 
rubbed his hands and chuckled with delight, “Doesn’t that burn 
beautifully?”  The burning of this Institute was a legitimate act of war.  It 
had been a school for the training of soldiers.
25
 
Strother, always claiming to be at the center of the action, described the scene:  “The 
Institute burnt out about two P.M. and the arsenal blew up with a smart explosion.  The 
General seemed to enjoy this scene and turning to me expressed his great satisfaction at 
having me with him.”26   
The soldiers involved in the burning felt compelled to justify the destruction of 
the Institute and did not take for granted that the general public would necessarily view it 
in the same light.  In Hunter’s official report, though, he offered no justification, 
reporting plainly, “On the 12th I also burned the Virginia Military Institute and all the 
buildings connected with it.”27  At least one Union soldier disagreed with the destruction 
of VMI:  Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes.  Hayes served in General George Crook’s 
division under Hunter, and the future president’s wartime diaries and letters often 
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reflected criticism of Hunter.  About the burning of the Institute, Hayes wrote in his 
diary, “This does not suit many of us.  General Crook, I know, disapproves.”28 
Many of the soldiers looted and vandalized the Institute before applying the torch.  
Reader admitted, “We got all kinds of trophies in the academy.”29  The next day he 
wrote, “There are some of the most extensive libraries here that I ever saw.  I have 
procured some very good works.  The cadets who attended the Military Academy here 
lived in style.”30  Ohio artilleryman J. O. Humphreys noted wryly, 
Both the Institute and the College were well rummaged by the boys, and 
the clothing of the cadets and the libraries of the two institutions received 
much attention. Indeed it is doubtful if ever an army was so devoted to 
literature as was our Corps. A quantity of ordnance and the Q. M. stores 
were found at the Institute which were burned with the buildings.
31
   
Strother witnessed much of the same activity; when the order to burn the building 
was carried out, “the plunderers came running out, their arms full of spoils.  One fellow 
had a stuffed gannet from the museum of natural history; others had the high-topped hats 
of cadet officers, and most of them were loaded with the most useless and impracticable 
articles.”32  Strother insisted that he was offered “some beautifully illustrated volumes of 
natural history,” but he “felt averse to taking anything and left them at Professor 
Smith’s.”  His “only spoil” was a VMI button “and a pair of gilt epaulettes which some of 
the clerks had picked up and handed” him.33  Strother seemed compelled to justify both 
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the looting and burning of the Institute, perhaps because he was a native son of the state 
he was now raiding. 
Rummaging and looting were not confined to enlisted men.  Lieutenant John 
Rodgers Meigs was only twenty-three when he rode into Lexington with Hunter’s men.  
The son of Union Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs had graduated first in 
the Class of 1863 from West Point.  Meigs figured prominently in the raid, and, 
ironically, his death in October 1864 in Dayton, Virginia—a mere sixty miles from 
Lexington—touched off yet another round of burning in the Shenandoah Valley.  Meigs 
personally removed some of the school’s mathematical instruments and left a note in the 
Dialectic Literary Society’s record book: 
Lexington, June 12, 1864 
The next meeting of the Di was probably interfered with by the 
threatening advance of the Yankees under Siegel [sic], who marched up 
the Valley of Virginia against them.  The cadets and other southern forces 
defeated Siegel at New Market:  but three weeks afterwards, in a battle at 
Piedmont, near Weyer's Cave, Gen. Hunter, Siegel's successor, utterly 
routed their force, and took 1,000 prisoners.  At this moment, the Virginia 
military institute is a mass of flames. 
John R. Meigs
34
 
In an incident reminiscent of traditional college pranks among rival schools, Meigs 
wanted a trophy from the southern military academy to send back to his alma mater in the 
North.  He helped capture VMI’s beloved statue of George Washington, a bronze copy of 
the famous original by Jean Antoine Houdon.  Strother claimed to have aided Meigs in 
his escapade:  
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I suggested to the General that the bronze statue of Washington in front of 
the Institute should be sent to Wheeling by the train as a trophy for West 
Virginia.  Meigs, who undertook the boxing and moving of it, insisted that 
it should go to West Point, and as I was indifferent as to what was its 
destination I consented readily.  The fire had not injured the statue in the 
least, and as I looked at the dignified and noble countenance I felt 
indignant that this effigy should be left to adorn a country whose 
inhabitants were striving to destroy a government which he founded.
35
 
Not all northerners felt that Virginia was unfit to own the Washington statue.  A 
Milwaukee newspaper compared the theft unfavorably to Napoleon’s practice of stealing 
artwork from conquered nations.  The editorial—gleefully reprinted the next day in the 
Lynchburg Virginian—called it “an act of vandalism without earthly excuse—it is a theft 
that nothing can palliate—disgraceful to the age, and doubly so to the country that will 
suffer such a sacrilege to go unwhipped of justice.”  The scathing article concluded, “In 
the world’s history it is without a parallel, and our hope is that it may remain so.” 36  The 
statue even made an appearance in the Official Records; Hunter’s Special Order No. 15 
noted that  
Capt. A. V. Barringer, chief quartermaster, Department of West Virginia, 
will forward to Col. A. H. Bowman, superintendent of the Military 
Academy, West Point, N. Y., the bronze statue of General George 
Washington, captured at the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, Va., 
to be placed in the grounds at the Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.
37
   
Despite this effort, the founding father’s likeness ended up in Wheeling, West 
Virginia, as a gift to the new state’s governor, and Strother himself orchestrated 
the statue’s return to the Institute in 1866, while serving as Virginia’s adjutant 
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general.
38
  The self-proclaimed “Virginia Yankee” demonstrated some 
ambivalence about his role in the raid. 
 Though Reader insisted, “We have destroyed all public property that we can get 
at,”39 there was one noteworthy exception.  Washington College stood less than a mile 
from VMI, but the school escaped the flames that engulfed its neighbor.  Beach recalled 
that “Hunter proposed also to burn Washington College that had been endowed by 
President Washington.  But so many of his officers protested so vigorously that it was 
spared.”40  The college escaped the flames, but it did not escape the attention of the 
plunderers and pillagers.  In an August 1864 report to the Board of Trustees, clerk J. L. 
Campbell detailed the destruction: 
All closed doors were broken open, window-glafs [sic] & sash were 
smashed to pieces, and preparations were made for burning the buildings, 
which is said to have been prevented by the timely intervention of Capt. 
D. E. Moore, a member of your Board. . . . no sooner had the enemy made 
their appearance on the College grounds, than the doors of the Laboratory 
were broken open, and every article it contained either broken to pieces or 
carried off. . . . The whole presents a scene of desolation and destruction 
which could not easily be surpafsed [sic]. . . . The libraries of the College 
and the literary Societies, were broken open, and about half the books 
carried off, and many of those left behind were seriously mutilated and 
defaced.  The furniture of the society halls was taken out and distributed 
amongst the negroes of the town.   
Campbell also lamented, “There is no hope of recovering any thing like the whole of the 
lost volumes,” but several books eventually made their way back to the college after the 
war, some of them many decades later.
41
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Strother saved the school from complete destruction, writing, “A trustee of 
Washington College called to explain that the soldiers were sacking the building and 
desired a guard to protect it.  I ordered it immediately and explained to him why we were 
disposed to treat his college in a different manner from the Institute.”  The college 
survived because of its connection to George Washington as well as its identification as a 
civilian educational institution.  The soldiers in this instance restrained their commander 
from ordering its burning.  Yet Strother reported that the soldiers were “pelting the statue 
of the father of their country on the cupola, supposing it to represent Jefferson Davis.”42  
Washington statues received a great deal of attention in Lexington that June day. 
 Hunter spared most of the private homes in Lexington, but there was one home 
that he did not ignore.  John Letcher lived in Lexington, between VMI and Washington 
College.  Letcher had served as Virginia’s governor from 1860-1864 and had left office 
by the time of Hunter’s Raid.  Fearing capture, Letcher escaped the town just ahead of the 
Union Army, leaving his family behind.  According to Strother, “An officer brought to 
General Hunter a proclamation issued by ex-Governor Letcher inciting the people to arise 
and wage a guerilla warfare upon the vandal hordes of Yankee invaders.  After issuing 
this foolish and abusive paper, the ex-Governor himself took to his heels.”43  Hunter gave 
orders to burn Letcher’s home in retaliation for the alleged guerilla proclamation.  The 
destruction of the Letcher home created more controversy than any other incident in 
Hunter’s Raid and elicited discussion of both its legality and appropriateness from Union 
soldiers and southern civilians alike. 
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The original letter from Letcher has never been recovered, but word of its 
existence spread throughout the Union Army in Lexington, though the supposed 
particulars of the letter varied from source to source.  Beach wrote, “In a printing office at 
Lexington were found copies of a handbill issued and signed by Letcher, that had been 
posted through the country, calling on the people to ‘bushwhack’ Hunter’s men, murder 
them by shooting them from concealed places.  This was not open warfare.”44  
Pennsylvania soldier Sidney Marlin heard about Letcher’s proclamation and wrote to his 
wife that the former governor “had left the town before we came in and had ishued [sic] a 
proclamation for the people to harris [harass] us all they could.  I believe that is the 
reason his buildings were burnt.”45  A soldier in the 3rd West Virginia Cavalry elaborated 
on the prevailing rumor regarding the Letcher note, reporting the burning of Letcher’s 
home was “done by order of Genl. Hunter because of the finding of circulars calling on 
the people to poison an [sic] bushwhack Yankee invaders.  The burning was done tho. 
[though] protested against by Genl. Averill & Genl. Crooks.”46  Reader gave no 
explanation for the act, only commenting, “We burnt some fine buildings, among others 
the residence of Gov. Letcher.”47  Humphreys also neglected to mention the handbill:  
“Drunken Rebel ex-Governor John Letcher's house was also burned--a very appropriate 
and fitting way of doing things to such men.”48  He failed to elaborate on why Letcher 
deserved the destruction of his home, but perhaps his governance of a state in the 
Confederacy justified the destruction in Humphreys’ mind.   
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Whether the letter actually existed or not, Hunter mentioned it in his official 
report:   
I found here [in Lexington] a violent and inflammatory proclamation from 
John Letcher, lately Governor of Virginia, inciting the population of the 
country to rise and wage a guerrilla warfare on my troops, and 
ascertaining that after having advised his fellow-citizens to this course the 
ex-Governor had himself ignominiously taken to flight, I ordered his 
property to be burned under my order, published May 24, against persons 
practicing or abetting such unlawful and uncivilized warfare.
49
 
Hayes predictably criticized the Letcher fire and offered an alternate explanation for 
Hunter’s decision.  He wrote to his wife,  
General Hunter turned Mrs. Governor Letcher and daughters out of their 
home at Lexington and on ten minutes’ notice burned the beautiful place 
in retaliation for some bushwhackers’ burning out Governor Pierpont [of 
West Virginia.]  And I am glad to say that General Crook’s division 
officers and men were all disgusted with it.
50
   
Hayes and some of his comrades were clearly uncomfortable with the destruction of 
Letcher’s private property, and they did not embrace Hunter’s interpretation of hard war. 
Letcher’s home was the only private residence destroyed in the Lexington 
occupation.  The former governor penned a letter on July 5 that was later published in the 
Lynchburg Virginian.  Letcher explained his rapid retreat from Lexington:  “The threats 
made by the Yankees, against me, for the past two years, satisfied me that they would 
destroy my house when they got to Lexington; but I always supposed they would allow 
the furniture and my family’s clothing to be removed.  In this, however, I was 
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disappointed.”51  Not surprisingly, Letcher’s piece in the newspaper made no mention of 
the alleged handbill. 
The story about Mrs. Letcher receiving only a few moments’ notice to evacuate 
her home was well-documented by her neighbors and repeated in many Union diaries, 
adding color to the local lore of Hunter’s Raid, but each account varied in specifics.  
Governor Letcher detailed the incident in his letter:  Hunter’s medical director, Dr. 
Patton, took a room in the Letcher home for the night on the evening of June 11.  The 
next morning at breakfast, he told Letcher’s daughter “that it was the last meal she would 
take in the house.”  When Mrs. Letcher approached Captain    Towns about the 
possibility her house would be burned, he replied that Letcher, “being a private citizen, 
and the house being private property, burning it would be an inexcusable outrage.”        
According to Letcher, Towns went to Hunter “and was directed by Hunter to 
assure [Mrs. Letcher] that the house would not be disturbed.”  Letcher believed this was a 
deliberate ruse “to quiet her apprehensions and thus prevent anything from being 
removed.”  Captain Berry arrived and “informed her that he was ordered by Hunter to fire 
the house.”  When Mrs. Letcher asked to see the order, he said it was verbal and told her 
she had five minutes to evacuate.  Berry refused her plea to rescue the family’s clothing, 
but as the fire was ignited, Letcher’s daughter attempted to run outside with an armful of 
clothes.  Berry discovered her and “ran forward and fired the clothing in her arms.”  
Letcher’s elderly mother lived next door, and twice her house caught fire as the former 
governor’s outbuildings burned, but Captain Towns ordered his men to “carry water and 
extinguish the flames,” saving the widow’s home.  Letcher also asserted that “Generals 
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Averill, Crook, Sullivan and Duffee
52
 denounced the whole proceeding as an outrage in 
violation of all the principles of civilized warfare, and stated that Hunter alone was 
responsible for these atrocities.”53  Even Union cavalryman Beach questioned Hunter’s 
decision, though he had decried Letcher’s handbill.  With the benefit of hindsight, Beach 
wrote, “Notwithstanding Letcher’s proclamation, the men of the regiment could not be 
made to look upon the burning of private residences as a proper act of war.  Nothing was 
gained by it, as was proved when, a few weeks later, Early entered Maryland.”54  The 
burning of the Letcher home challenged officers and enlisted men in the Union Army to 
reconsider how war should be waged in the Second Valley Campaign.     
 The Letcher home was the only privately-owned home razed by Union troops, but 
it was not the only residence destroyed in the raid.  Two houses owned by VMI and 
occupied by professors were also burned, but these were considered public property.  
VMI professor Major William Henry Gilham resided in one of the Institute’s houses.  
The destruction of his home was seen as a legitimate act of war by Hunter since it was 
property of the state of Virginia, but  the method of execution created a great deal of 
consternation, as demonstrated in three different accounts of the incident.  Strother 
offered one version of events: 
The General stopped at the house of Major Gilham, a professor of the 
Institute, and told the lady to get out her furniture as he intended to burn 
the house in the morning.  She was eminently ladylike and was troubled, 
but yet firm.  The house was a state building and it was fair to destroy it, 
yet it was her only home and it was hard to lose it, but she was a soldier’s 
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wife and a soldier’s daughter so she set us out some good applejack, 
apologizing she had nothing better, and then went to move out her 
furniture to the lawn.
55
  
The next day, June 12, he reported that Mrs. Gilham’s household items “were all piled on 
the parade ground and she sat in the midst, firm and ladylike.”  Strother claimed he 
procured from Captain Prendergast “two wagons and some orderlies to move” her things, 
and he “got a protection for her at the house she moved into to prevent soldiers from 
plundering her there.”  It bears noting that, according to Strother, Hunter gave Mrs. 
Gilham a great deal of notice that her residence would be burned, allowing her to remove 
and save personal items.  The home of VMI professor and Confederate officer Colonel 
Thomas Williamson was also burned, and Strother noted that “Mrs. Williamson had got 
her things off” as well.56   
A very different version appeared in McDonald’s reminiscences.  She 
remembered that the professors’ “distracted families amid the flames were rushing about 
trying to save some of their things, when they were forced to leave. . . officers standing 
by for the purpose.  Not even their books and papers could they save, and scarcely any 
clothes.”  McDonald’s version claimed that “Captain Prendergast knew Mrs. Gilham’s 
brother,” a colonel in the Union Army, “and for his sake granted her the particular favor 
of removing some of her household goods, which after she had succeeded in removing, 
she was compelled to stay by with her little boys to guard.”  McDonald confirmed that 
Gilham guarded her personal items but added that she sat up all night “to keep them from 
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being stolen by negroes and soldiers. . . and not a man dared to help her or offered to take 
her place,”57 denying any aid by Strother.    
Yet a third variation exists on the Gilham story.  Henry A. DuPont served under 
Crook as the Department of West Virginia’s Chief of Artillery and was responsible for 
shelling VMI before the burning.  DuPont recorded his memoirs on the war in the 1920s, 
often speaking very critically of Hunter.  His version lies somewhere between Strother’s 
and McDonald’s:   
With several other officers, I took part in saving some of the personal 
effects of Mrs. Gilham, wife of one of the professors of the Institute, by 
carrying out of her house with our own hands tables, sofas and other 
articles of furniture just before the building was set on fire.  Mrs. Gilham, 
whose brother was an officer of the United States Regular Army, was in 
great distress and we were only too glad to assist her in every way in our 
power.  Among those who helped I can only recall Captain William 
McKinley, afterwards President of the United States, and that popular and 
very good soldier, Captain Richard G. Prendergast of the First New York 
(Lincoln) Cavalry.
58
 
Clearly, major discrepancies exist among the various accounts.  Strother described 
himself as the hero in the Gilham story, but other accounts do not mention his role in the 
event.  DuPont wrote his book long after the war, but he corroborated Prendergrast’s 
aid—and omitted the colorful story about Mrs. Gilham passing around the applejack.  
McDonald’s diary, on the other hand, was edited after the war, and when she told the 
story of the Letcher house burning, she claimed to have been the only person in town 
who rushed to Mrs. Letcher’s aid.59  Lacking an account from Mrs. Gilham herself, the 
actual facts may never come to light.  Yet the variations in the accounts reveal something 
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far more important than who came to the woman’s aid and who did not.  The common 
thread among all three indicates that civilians and soldiers alike were uneasy with the 
destruction of private property, even if the property were located in a public building.  
The story about Mrs. Gilham guarding her household goods is present in all three, 
whether she eventually received help relocating her possessions or not.  McDonald, a 
southern woman and refugee herself, was understandably sympathetic and may have seen 
something of her own situation in that of Gilham’s, but two Union officers, Strother and 
DuPont also revealed sympathy for the displaced woman.  Whether or not they came to 
her aid, both men claimed to have been distressed by her displacement and were eager to 
help.  They were clearly not comfortable with the situation and tried to exonerate 
themselves from the act of destroying her residence by claiming they had rescued her in 
some way.  Both men distanced themselves from Hunter and his actions—DuPont 
explicitly and Strother implicitly.   
Unlike the two professors’ residences, the home of the Institute’s superintendent 
Francis H. Smith narrowly escaped the torch.  Strother’s diary reported only that Hunter’s 
staff—Strother included—set up headquarters in Smith’s house, also the property of 
VMI, and he supposed that Hunter spared the house because “the roof which has 
sheltered us, and the house where we have been entertained should be saved, whatever be 
its character otherwise.”60  On June 17, Smith penned a letter to Major General William 
H. Richards, Adjutant General of Virginia detailing the events of the previous few days in 
Lexington.  Smith described why he believed his home was spared even though it was 
state property:   
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The peculiar condition of my daughter, with a child only 48 hours old, 
induced my wife [Sarah Henderson Smith] to throw herself upon the 
courtesy of the commanding General. The appeal was not in vain; and I 
acknowledge with pleasure, this relaxation of the devastation which was 
unsparingly applied to every species of property owned by the state at the 
V.Mil. Institute, which we were unable to remove.
61
 
The newborn’s presence likely saved the home rather than its use as Hunter’s 
headquarters since this was generally not sufficient cause to spare homes in other raids.  
Curiously, Hunter neglected to mention the Smith residence at all in his official report.   
Like the Letcher story, the tale of the Smith home circulated widely among 
townspeople.  Sixteen-year-old Fannie Wilson relayed it in a letter to her father on June 
17:  “Sunday morning about 10 o'clock the Yankees set fire to the Institute, blew the 
walls down and destroyed the mess hall and professors' houses, and if General Smith's 
daughter, Mrs. Morrison, had not been very ill they fully intended destroying his elegant 
mansion.”62  Preston also commented on the incident in her diary:   
We asked him [Dr. P.—likely the same Dr. Patton who had stayed in the 
Letcher home] if they were going to burn our house; he said “not if it is 
private property.”  Gen. Hunter has ordered the burning of all the V. M. I. 
professors' houses.  Mrs. Smith plead for hers to be spared, on account of 
her daughter, who lies there desperately ill; that alone saved it. Hunter has 
his Head Quarters in it.
63
   
Another account of the Smith residence came from Rose Page Pendleton, the 
daughter of Confederate Brigadier General William Pendleton and the sister of Early’s 
chief of staff, Colonel Sandie Pendleton.  General Pendleton served as rector of Grace 
Episcopal Church in Lexington, and the family lived in the church’s rectory.  With the 
men away at war, Pendleton and the women of her family—her mother and unmarried 
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sisters—witnessed the raid and reported incidents very similar to what her neighbor 
Margaret Junkin Preston experienced.  The day of the Letcher burning, Pendleton 
reported, “All day they threatened to burn this house, but it not being ours they could not 
do it.”64  Raiders similarly threatened Preston, “One cavalryman told me that if they all 
talked as I did, they would fire the entire town.” Although Dr. P. had assured Preston her 
home was safe because it was private property, she worried that she, too, would be 
burned out:  “If our house is burned tonight, and we hear of my husband being captured 
or killed, what will life be worth? God protect and have mercy upon us all! To whom can 
we look but Thee!” 65  Civilians in Lexington had witnessed Hunter’s humanity as well as 
his destruction, but they remained uncertain of the limits he placed on the destruction and 
of their fate under his occupation.  The rules that had been in place throughout the war 
protecting civilian homes were now called into question by civilians and soldiers alike.   
 Civilian homes remained standing after Hunter’s men left Lexington, but the 
shelling during the skirmish between Hunter and McCausland before the Confederate 
Army’s retreat on June 11 caused a great deal of damage.  Hunter’s official report 
mentioned that “instead of crushing the place with my artillery, I sent General Averell 
with a brigade of cavalry” to engage the enemy.66  Fannie Wilson’s letter to her father 
reflected the terror of a teenage girl under enemy fire for the first time in her young life: 
The first shell that struck our part of town passed through Mrs. Johnston's 
house; the next one above ours tearing a circular hole just the size of the 
ball. We were standing in the front door when the ball passed over our 
heads, and fearing danger we went to the cellar, thinking that was the 
safest place, and were standing on the steps when we heard the whizzing 
near us; we found that another one had passed through our garret wall and 
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struck the rafter, exploding with a thundering noise. It knocked nearly all 
the plastering off and all the sash out of the windows, made a great many 
large holes in the wall and floor. One piece passed through the ceiling of 
the passage, two small pieces perforated the ceiling of grandpa's room just 
above the head of his bed in which he was lying at the time in a doze, and 
was aroused by the fall of the plaster.
67
 
Hunter’s restraint in demolishing the town with artillery escaped the notice of the 
civilians who experienced it. 
Preston recorded the activity as well, “We have been shelled in reply [to 
McCaulsand’s resistance] all day; one shell exploded in our orchard, a few yards beyond 
us, -- our house being just in their range as they threw them at the retreating 
Confederates.”68  News of the shelling even reached distant Halifax, North Carolina 
where diarist Catherine Ann Edmonston recorded and commented on news that touched 
her beloved Confederacy:  “Hunter with usual Yankee barbarity shelled the town of 
Lexington without notice.”69  In reality, Hunter merely ran off Confederate troops before 
he crossed the river into the town itself.  The artillery fire that seemed monumental to 
Lexingtonians would have been considered a much smaller inconvenience in Confederate 
towns that had seen a lot of action in the war.  The psychological damage to the 
townspeople’s peace of mind was far greater than the physical damage to their property. 
 Instead of artillery damage, the loss of provisions civilians recorded from 
widespread pillaging during the short occupation undoubtedly caused the most significant 
hardship of all.  Hunter’s strict orders regarding pillaging and looting fell by the wayside 
during his three days in the village.  The Preston home received repeated visits from 
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Hunter’s men, even though it sat several blocks away from VMI and the Letcher home, 
which became ground zero for the raid.  The Prestons, of course, received a great deal of 
notoriety because of Colonel Preston’s connections to the Institute as well as their family 
connection to the late “Stonewall” Jackson.  Their house also stood near the route many 
of the Union soldiers in Lexington took on their pilgrimage to Jackson’s grave on the 
edge of town, a curious fact many people noted during the occupation.   
At any rate, Preston recorded several visits during the raid, and her soldiers often 
left with items from the family’s food stores.  Days before Hunter’s arrival, on June 7, 
word of the Union approach reached Lexington, and Preston reported, “All was such 
commotion as I have never seen in Lexington; people moving flour, goods, &c.; driving 
out their cows; ladies flying about in a high state of excitement. . . . I was busy until ten 
o'clock getting off our bacon and flour, which E. tells me the enemy is taking all along 
the route.”70  As Yankees entered her side of town on June 11, Preston engaged the 
marauders in a war of words: 
At first they were content to receive bacon, two slices apiece; but they 
soon became insolent; demanded the smokehouse key, and told me they 
would break the door unless I opened it. I protested against their pillage, 
and with a score of them surrounding me, with guns in their hands, 
proceeded to the smokehouse and threw it open, entreating them at the 
same time, by the respect they had for their wives, mothers, and sisters, to 
leave me a little meat. They heeded me no more than wild beasts would 
have done; swore at me; and left me not one piece. Some rushed down the 
cellar steps, seized the newly churned butter there, and made off. I 
succeeded in keeping them out of the house. We have had no dinner; 
managed to procure a little supper; we have nailed up all the windows. I 
wrote a polite note to Gen. Averill, asking for a guard; none was sent. At 
ten we went to bed, feeling that we had nothing between these ravagers 
and us but God's protecting arm.
71
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Colonel Preston had fled to the nearby mountains to escape capture, and Preston’s 
home was targeted yet again by the enemy.  On Sunday, June 12, she was astonished to 
see soldiers in her home once more: 
I had left the smokehouse door open, to let them see that every piece of 
meat was taken (I had some hid under the porch, which as yet they have 
not found). They came into the dining-room, and began to carry away the 
china, when a young fellow from Philadelphia (he said) took the dishes 
from them, and made them come out. I told them all I was a Northern 
woman, but confessed that I was ashamed of my Northern lineage when I 
saw them come on such an errand. They demanded to be let into the cellar, 
and one fellow threatened me with the burning of the house if I did not 
give them just what they demanded. I said, "Yes, we are at your mercy -- 
burn it down -- but I won't give you the key."
72
 
The soldiers did not burn the house down, and Preston eventually received the guard she 
requested.   
Later that same afternoon, Preston received word of more personal loss:  “One of 
our overseers has just come into town, and has told one of our servants that every sheep 
has been slaughtered, every cow, and the horses carried off. We are ruined, nearly; if this 
house is burned, then all is gone but the bare land.”73  Preston credited the unnamed 
soldier who served as her guard with preserving her home by advising her to dispose of 
seven trunks the family held for VMI cadets who were out of town.  Fearing repercussion 
for possessing contraband from the Institute, Preston cut the cadets’ brand new uniforms 
into small strips and hid them in the attic.  She had one more very valuable item that she 
kept secret even from her guard:   
There was still Jackson's sword. With great trouble we carried it under our 
clothes -- that sword that had flashed victoriously over many a battle field 
-- and finally concealed it in an outhouse.  Then breathing freely for the 
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first time since our fright, we went to the guard and told him there was not 
to our knowledge, and we were willing to take our oath upon it, an article 
of contraband clothing, or an instrument of defence in the house. He said 
he was perfectly satisfied, and nobody should enter the house to search, 
except over him.
74
 
Preston succeeded in her deception, and the late general’s sword escaped becoming the 
greatest trophy of all.  Preston’s ambiguous relationship with the occupying soldiers 
demonstrates a common tension between Union men and southern women.  Soldiers’ 
attitudes varied from animosity toward the de facto defenders of the homefront to a sense 
of chivalry and a desire to protect these women who reminded them of wives and 
mothers back home.  The Lynchburg Virginian reprinted an excerpt from the Lexington 
Gazette, “During their march through the Valley they subsisted upon the people.  
Families were stripped of all their flour, meat, corn, lard, butter, and, indeed everything 
laid up for their support.  They made no discrimination between the families of Unionists 
and Secessionists.”75  This lack of “discrimination” reveals that the Union Army 
employed hard war tactics on the southern population at large, regardless of loyalty, at 
least in the case of Lexington. 
 Hunter left Lexington on June 14 and turned east toward Lynchburg, determined 
to accomplish the goal Grant had originally set for him.  He had not won any great 
military victory in Lexington and had not injured the Confederate infrastructure in any 
meaningful way.  He did accomplish the temporary destruction of a loathsome southern 
institution that had humiliated his predecessor.  Hunter had also introduced the people of 
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Lexington to war in a new way.  They had sent loved ones off to fight three years before, 
but they had not witnessed the destruction and terror of war itself.  Union soldier Lynch 
wrote simply, “Lexington is a beautiful town.  The scenery grand.  Reported to us that the 
sound of Yankee guns had never been heard here before, or until today.”76  Preston noted 
that the town had anticipated invasion in the past but had always been spared.  Just before 
the raid, she wrote, “We have hidden our own valuables to some extent; and Mr. P. is 
having his bacon hauled into the mountains. Yet the enemy may not come; we have 
expected them so often when they didn't come, that we may be delivered again.”77  
Young Fannie Wilson recognized the hard lessons that came with invasion:  “I seemed to 
have spent a lifetime in one day. I never before had an idea of the terror caused by the 
shelling of a town, never seemed to realize what it meant.”78  Wilson could have spoken 
for most of the townspeople.   
Lexington had indeed been more fortunate than many other Virginia towns within 
a hundred miles to the east or north.  The fact that the town had only lately been at war 
dramatically improved its chances for rebuilding.  Washington College sustained 
substantial loss in materials, but the buildings remained completely intact.  Confederate 
General Robert E. Lee became president of the school several months after the war 
ended, and restoring the college to its former glory became his responsibility.  In a letter 
to the Board of Trustees in June 1866, Lee mentioned the destruction, though he dated 
the raid incorrectly:  “Owing to the impracticability of completing the repairs to the 
College buildings, and of restoring the furniture, apparatus destroyed by Genl Hunter’s 
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army in 1863, the exercises of the session did not commence until the 2
nd
. of Oct. 
1865.”79  Lee should be forgiven for the error in date; he was occupied with Union 
General Grant in Petersburg that June of 1864 when Hunter came through Lexington.  In 
1867, the Trustees of Washington College still felt the effects of Hunter’s Raid, though 
the school was operating on a normal schedule by then.  A report to the Board of Trustees 
from the school’s librarian revealed lingering resentment:   
The Library is much improved in appearance during the last twelve 
months. . . but it has not revered entirely from the ravages of the Northern 
vandals who passed through our village in June 1864.  Many of the books 
cause unpleasant feelings having the marks of their unholy hands upon 
them, many of the most valuable books with their mutilated sets remain an 
eyesore to the beholder keeping alive many disagreeable sensations 
against our invaders.
80
 
The preservation of Washington College during the raid demonstrated the hard 
line the Union Army attempted to draw between state and private property, at least at this 
point in the war.  No one seems to have argued vigorously that the school warranted 
decimation.  Washington College recovered quickly, and by late July 1864, the faculty 
began posting advertisements in the Lexington Gazette to announce the resumption of 
classes on September 15.  The ad also discussed housing:  “BOARDING can be procured 
in Lexington without difficulty—especially when payment is made in PROVISIONS.”81  
The town swiftly attempted to return to a degree of normalcy.   
 Lexington’s other educational institution, Virginia Military Institute, faced 
extraordinary challenges, given that its student body was largely scattered by war and its 
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buildings were destroyed. The cadets relocated to Richmond for the duration of the war, 
but by October 1865, they returned to their Lexington campus to rebuild.  Some of the 
very men who aided in its destruction later played major roles in its rebuilding.  Strother, 
of course, arranged for the return of the Washington statue, which even today stands in 
front of the school’s Washington Arch.  Henry A. DuPont, the artillery commander who 
had shelled the school in advance of Hunter’s occupation, introduced a bill in the Senate 
that President Woodrow Wilson eventually signed into law, awarding the school 
$100,000 in compensation for wartime damages.  Ironically, the funds helped build 
Jackson Memorial Hall, named for Confederate General “Stonewall” Jackson.82  
Although the Institute’s role in the rebellion justified its burning in most Union soldiers’ 
opinions, DuPont’s and Strother’s postwar relief to the institution they both helped 
destroy revealed either a sense of regret for the burning or a sense of personal 
responsibility for helping to restore the school.  Neither soldier appears to have wanted 
the legacy of Hunter’s Raid to end with destruction alone. 
 Though the destruction in Lexington loomed large for residents in June 1864, the 
majority of the population proved remarkably accepting of their fate at David Hunter’s 
hands.  They understood that the presence of the Institute placed them at risk, and 
although they lamented the destruction of the buildings, they quickly resolved to rebuild 
and move forward.  Townspeople and VMI faculty even saw the Institute’s devastation as 
a badge of honor.  The fact that Hunter targeted the institution validated its significance 
in the Confederate cause.  “In a time of war it was not to be expected that the Va. Mil. 
Institute should escape the effects of the devastations which has visited by fire and rapine 
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the fairest portions of our beloved commonwealth,” wrote Superintendent Smith shortly 
after the fire.
83
   
The next month, in his annual report, Smith elaborated and even defended VMI as 
a legitimate target: 
No one, therefore, belonging to the institution can complain that the rules 
of war should be applied to an establishment marked by such evidences of 
identification with our revolutionary struggle. It was to have been 
expected that the cadets should be pursued, that they might be either killed 
or captured. They asked no immunities from the rigors of war meted to 
others. The arms and munitions of war were proper subjects for capture or 
destruction. Its public buildings might have been held by the enemy as a 
barracks or hospital, and the school itself dispersed. But modern history is 
appealed to in vain for a like instance of devastation, as marked the track 
of the invader here.
84
 
Smith gave the impression that he would have been disappointed—dishonored, even—if 
the Institute had survived Hunter’s Raid unmolested.  The Official Records reveal 
expectation of the Institute’s demise as well.  On June 11, the day before the fire, John 
W. Brockenbrough, a Virginia judge, sent a message to Confederate Secretary of War 
James Seddon describing the military situation in Lexington and concluding, “Doubtless 
the Virginia Military Institute is now a heap of ruins.”85  No one was surprised that 
Hunter set fire to the Institute. 
 Conversely, Hunter did surprise everyone and seemed to cross their definition of 
the line of civilized warfare when he targeted private property.  Foraging and pillaging 
were clearly expected, as the townspeople removed food and valuables from their homes 
and attempted to conceal them in the mountains for safekeeping.  Virginia had been at 
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war too long for Lexington’s civilians to expect any less at the hands of the invaders.  
There was an explicit expectation, though, on the part of both northern soldier and 
southern civilian that private homes were sacrosanct, even as late as 1864.  One 
humorous story from Superintendent Smith’s annual report in July 1864 demonstrates 
what civilians saw as the great divide between public and private:   
All the regular Negro servants of the institution showed a marked fidelity. 
Our trusty baker, Anderson, the property of the institute, was stripped of 
everything; and on being asked whether he had made himself known as 
belonging to the state, promptly replied, "No indeed---if I had told the 
Yankees that, they would have burnt me up with the other state 
property."
86
 
In this anecdote, even slaves believed that public property was vulnerable to the Union 
Army, while private property was unassailable.   
From her soapbox in North Carolina, Edmonston concluded her diary entry 
detailing the Letcher fire with commentary on the destruction of private property:   
The savages, they cannot understand & are incapable of being made to 
appreciate the sublime lesson taught them last summer by Gen Lee in his 
march through Penn! -- a spectacle, however, at which one day the 
civilized world will stand in amazed admiration, amazed that an army 
burning under the sense of such wrongs & outrages on their own homes 
could yet leave unmolested the homes of their enemies when in their 
power, & this, & deeds worse than this, is the return we get for it!
87
 
Lee’s march through the North on his way to Gettysburg set the standard in southern 
minds for the behavior of an army in enemy territory when he forbade Confederate troops 
from damaging private property; until the Second Valley Campaign, southerners 
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expected similar treatment from the Union Army and compared them unfavorably to the 
Confederate Army when they failed to meet Lee’s standards.88   
Residents throughout Rockbridge County felt the effects of the destruction, even 
if they did not experience it firsthand.  Farmer Henry Boswell Jones of nearby 
Brownsburg was a longtime diarist who typically recorded brief notes about his crops, the 
weather, and the Sunday sermon.  His much longer notes about Hunter’s Raid are telling 
for their departure from his standard entries:   
June 11—These past days are very eventful, both the Confederates and 
Federals have been about us.  The people have suffered considerably but 
praise be to God our lives have been spared.  June 14—the Federal army 
left Lexington, after burning the Institute, Governor John Letcher’s home, 
the mills, all the store houses, the furnaces and taken off nearly all the 
good horses, cows and sheep in the county.  They have done us much 
injury, oh!  Lord have mercy upon us and them.
89
 
Jones lived outside Lexington and suffered no personal loss at the hands of the enemy, 
but he expressed dismay over the destruction, and the burning of mills and stores 
impacted residents beyond the town itself. 
Perhaps the best expression of post-raid sentiment comes from Preston, who took 
up poetry after the raid and became known as the “Poetess of the Confederacy,” even 
though she had identified herself as a “northern woman” when Yankee troops raided her 
home.  On June 17, 1864, less than a week after the Union Army departed her town, 
Preston demonstrated the resilient spirit that permeated Lexington on the heels of 
disaster: 
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Our spirits begin to rise already, and we cease to feel subjugated, as we 
surely did two days ago. I thought the cause of the Confederacy was 
finished for the present, or at least that it was a hopeless struggle. I feel 
differently now. As to losses, Mr. P. says that $30,000 would scarcely 
cover what he has lost by this invasion. He is a poor man now for the rest 
of his days, he says; but he bears it with a brave and Christian spirit, and 
utters no complaint.
90
 
The town had changed, and the people had changed, but neither had been destroyed.  
Even the exterior walls of Virginia Military Institute still stood, a certain sign that 
Lexington itself would survive.
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Chapter 2: McCausland’s Raid on Chambersburg 
 The residents of Lexington quickly resolved to rebuild and move forward, but 
they harbored no thoughts of forgiveness for the destruction the Union Army had 
wrought.  Within a month of Hunter’s Raid, the Lexington Gazette called for retaliation:  
“Some of our soldiers who passed through the town a few days since the invader left 
declared that some Yankee institution should pay the appropriate penalty in full measure, 
if they were ever permitted to invade Northern territory.  So may it be.”1  General David 
Hunter made his way to Lynchburg, but he retreated from a smaller Confederate force 
under Lieutenant General Jubal Early.  On July 19, Hunter ordered the burning of three 
private homes in Jefferson County, West Virginia, each apparently singled out because of 
its owner.  One belonged to Edmund Lee, a distant relative of Confederate General 
Robert E. Lee, and another to Alexander Boteler, who had served in the Confederate 
Congress.  The third doomed residence was that of General Hunter’s own cousin, 
Andrew Hunter, an attorney who had prosecuted John Brown in the famous Harpers 
Ferry trial.  The southern press exhibited as much outrage over these three homes as they 
did the Letcher home in Lexington. 
 Meanwhile, the bulk of the opposing armies continued to stare at each other 
across their respective trenches in Petersburg, Virginia.  Lee found himself tied down 
against Union General Ulysses S. Grant in a desperate attempt to prevent the capture of 
Richmond, and he entrusted the western flank of his army to Early and his 14,000 men.  
Early tried to divert Union troops from General Ulysses S. Grant’s main army with an 
attack on the Union capital in Washington, but he was turned back just outside the city in 
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mid-July.  In addition to creating a diversion for Lee, he personally aspired to bring the 
war home to the North in a tangible way. 
  Early decided to compensate for the financial losses Hunter caused in Virginia 
and West Virginia by demanding ransoms from northern towns near the Confederate 
border.  On July 6, he sent Brigadier General John McCausland and his 2,500 soldiers to 
Hagerstown, Maryland, with orders to obtain $200,000; however, McCausland misread 
the orders and only acquired $20,000.
2
  McCausland made up the difference in nearby 
Frederick, successfully demanding $200,000 from the townspeople.
3
  Maryland towns 
avoided the torch by contributing $220,000 to Confederate coffers.  The success of 
McCausland’s ransom demands created a growing sense of urgency in towns near the 
Mason-Dixon Line. 
Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin feared a Confederate attack in his state, 
and both he and Major General Darius Couch asked Secretary of War Edwin Stanton for 
permission to activate the state militia for protection.  Stanton denied the request, even 
though Couch commanded the Department of the Susquehanna, a unit that had been 
formed in 1863 to protect southern Pennsylvania.
4
  Meanwhile, Confederate units 
continued to harass and threaten Union supply and communication lines from Baltimore 
to southern Pennsylvania in an attempt to draw Union troops away from Petersburg.  On 
July 29, an advance unit under McCausland skirmished with Brigadier General William 
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Averell’s cavalry for several hours in Hagerstown, eventually driving Union troops 
twelve miles north to Greencastle, Pennsylvania.
5
       
The next day, McCausland rode into Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, no doubt 
hoping to reproduce his previous success in obtaining a ransom.  He took around 600 
men into Chambersburg itself and posted his remaining 2,000 men and 6 artillery pieces 
on the outskirts of town to scout for Union troops.  This time, Early had instructed 
McCausland to demand the enormous sum of $500,000 in greenbacks or $100,000 in 
gold; if the townspeople did not pay, troops were ordered to set fire to the town. Early 
rationalized his decision in his postwar memoirs:   
A number of towns in the South, as well as private country houses, had 
been burned by the Federal troops.  I came to the conclusion it was time to 
open the eyes of the people of the North to this enormity, by an example in 
the way of retaliation. . . . I desired to give the people of Chambersburg an 
opportunity of saving their town, by making compensation for part of the 
injury done, and hoped the payment of such a sum would have the effect 
of causing the adoption of a different policy.
6
 
Early’s explanation revealed that the raid on Chambersburg was about much more than 
money.  He sought retribution for the damage that had been done in the South and 
claimed that he thought the raid might steer the Union’s war policy away from hard war 
where southern civilians were concerned. 
McCausland’s postwar account verified Early’s version, adding, “It appears that 
the policy of General Early had been adopted upon proper reflection; that his orders were 
distinct and final, and that what was done on this occasion by my command was not the 
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result of inconsiderate action or want of proper authority.”7  Two important facts emerge 
from McCausland:  Early was responsible for ordering the burning in Chambersburg, and 
Early had, presumably, carefully weighed and considered the implementation of hard war 
in Pennsylvania.  McCausland did not believe his general had acted rashly and without 
thought.   
Ironically, Lee had issued orders forbidding the destruction of private property the 
year before from Chambersburg, on his army’s march through Pennsylvania to the battle 
of Gettysburg: 
No greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole 
people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the unarmed 
and defenseless and the wanton destruction of private property, that have 
marked the course of the enemy in our own country. . . . It must be 
remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot 
take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering 
ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the 
atrocities of our enemies, and offending against Him to whom vengeance 
belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in 
vain. 
He then “earnestly exhort[ed] the troops to abstain with most scrupulous care from 
unnecessary or wanton injury to private property” and “enjoin[ed] upon all officers to 
arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend against the 
orders on this subject.”8  Lee’s orders in the summer of 1863 had set the standard for 
expected behavior of Confederate troops; they were well known and often repeated.  It 
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also bears noting that Lee issued those orders nearly a year before the Union Army began 
employing hard war policies consistently in the South. 
 Confederate troops had visited Chambersburg several times in the past:  J. E. B. 
Stuart conducted a famous horse raid there in 1862 and, as Lee’s orders showed, the bulk 
of the Confederate Army had passed through the town on the way to Gettysburg, which 
lay twenty miles west.  Fearing yet another Confederate raid, Chambersburg leaders 
claimed to have moved the bank deposits out of town, making them both unwilling and 
unable to pay the enormous amount McCausland demanded.
9
  A Chambersburg 
newspaper from August 8 provided details on the ransom demand, “[McCausland] had 
the Court House bell rung to convene the citizens, hoping to frighten them into the 
payment of a large sum of money; but no one attended.  No. . . effort was made either by 
individuals singly or in organized capacities to make terms—all had resolved that the 
free-booter should fulfill his threat rather than pay tribute.”10  This particular article 
appeared more than a week after the burning, so the details of the townspeople’s reaction 
may reflect more bravado than they actually exhibited at the time.   
One eyewitness wrote, “The citizens stated that it was utterly impossible to pay 
the sum named either in gold or currency, and that the demand could not be made in good 
faith.  They further remonstrated against the monstrosity of burning a whole town of six 
thousand inhabitants, in retaliation for the six or eight houses” that had been burned in 
                                               
9 Chambersburg residents J. W. Douglas and A. Holler both substantiate the claim that the bank had 
relocated its funds in anticipation of an enemy raid.  Jacob Hoke, Historical Reminiscences of the War or 
Incidents Which Transpired in and about Chambersburg during the War of the Rebellion (Chambersburg, 
PA: M. A. Foltz, 1884), 112-113. 
10 “Tribute Demanded,” Franklin Repository, August 8, 1864.  The local presses burned in the raid, and 
newspapers resumed printing shortly after. 
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Virginia and West Virginia.
11
  McCausland waited to see if his demand would be met, 
later insisting that he gave the town six hours’ notice.  He wrote in his postwar account, 
“After a few hours of delay many citizens came to me—some were willing to pay the 
money, others were not. I urged them to comply with such reasons as occurred to me at 
the time, and told them plainly what they might expect.”12  None of the townspeople’s 
accounts supported McCausland’s claim that he gave them six hours’ notice before 
ordering the burning.  McCausland likely tried to ameliorate his reputation after the war.  
Furthermore, Averell’s 2nd Cavalry Division of around 2,500 men was close by, and time 
was short.  Confederate Captain Harry Gilmor recounted that “scouts returned with a 
prisoner from Averill’s command, reporting him to be not more than two or three miles 
off, with a heavy force of cavalry.  The citizens knew it too, and positively refused to 
raise the money, laughing at us when we threatened to burn the town.”13   
Despite the Confederate warnings, townspeople failed to meet the demand, and 
Confederate troops set about the grim task of razing the town.  Newspaper reports and 
personal letters from the time varied wildly on the damage, but the commonly accepted 
statistics are the following:  550 buildings were destroyed, including 278 homes and 
businesses (the remaining structures were barns and outbuildings).  More than 2,000 
people were left homeless, and real estate damages totaled over $783,000.
14
  One resident 
summed up the damage as follows, “The entire heart or body of the town is burned.  Not 
a house or building of any kind is left on a space of about an average of two squares of 
                                               
11 Rev. B.S. Schneck, D.D., The Burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: Lindsay & 
Blakiston, 1865), 15. 
12 M’Causland. 
13 Harry Gilmor, Four Years in the Saddle (1866; repr., Baltimore, MD: Butternut and Blue, 1987), 209. 
14 Ted Alexander, Southern Revenge!: Civil War History of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania (Chambersburg, 
PA: Greater Chambersburg Chamber of Commerce and White Mane Publishing Company, 1989), 132. 
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streets, extending each way from the centre, with some four or five exceptions, where the 
buildings were isolated.  Only the outskirts are left.”15  Ironically, one of the houses on 
the outskirts of town that remained standing had housed John Brown while he planned his 
doomed raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859.
16
    
Harrowing stories from the victims immediately poured out.  Citizens reported 
soldiers breaking into homes and businesses and drinking all the alcohol they could find.  
Plundering and looting abounded and went unchecked by the officers.  The newspaper 
hinted that McCausland’s men had experience in pillaging and had even been trained to 
do so, saying they “exhibited the proficiency of their training by immediate and almost 
indiscriminate robbery.”  The article cited soldiers’ robbing of people on the streets and 
credited the thieves as having “a dexterity that would have done credit to the free-booting 
accomplishments of an Italian brigand.”17  Theft continued inside private homes as the 
raiders divided into “squads” and moved from house to house, robbing and burning.  
Townspeople widely reported that soldiers demanded bribes to save individual homes, 
sometimes burning the homes even after ransoms were paid: 
Many families had the utmost difficulty to get themselves and children out 
in time and not one-half had so much as a change of clothing with them. . . 
. Several invalids had to be carried out as the red flames licked their 
couches.  Thus the work of desolation continued for two hours. . . . No one 
was spared save by accident.
18
 
                                               
15 Schneck, 16.   
16 Some reports from the time indicated that Chambersburg was targeted by Confederate troops because of 
its connection to John Brown, but this seems highly unlikely since the house he had lived in did not burn in 
the raid. 
17 “Plundering Promptly Commenced,” Franklin Repository, August 24, 1864. 
18
 “Burning of Chambersburg,” Franklin Repository, August 24, 1864. 
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Some of the eyewitness reports likely exaggerated the terror caused by undisciplined 
Confederate soldiers, but the careful restraint Hunter had exhibited in Lexington was 
clearly absent in his Confederate counterpart. 
With many of the men away at war, women were left to fend off the invaders.  
One soldier’s wife recorded her experience in a diary,  
They gave no time for people to get any thing out.  Each had to escape for 
life & took only what they could first grab.  Some saved considerable.  
Others only the clothes on their backs--& even some of those were taken 
off as they escaped from their burning dwellings.  O! the 30
th
 July 1864 
was a sad day to the people of Chambersburg.  In most of cases where the 
buildings were left money was paid.  They were here too but we talked 
them out of it.  We told them we were widdows [sic] & that saved us 
here.
19
 
Louisa Brand became the town’s heroine when she wrapped an American flag around 
herself, “and with revolver in hand, stood in the front door of their house and dared any 
rebel to fire the house or disturb the flag.  She passed unmolested and the house was not 
burned.”20  Some of the Confederate raiders demonstrated a reluctance to burn out 
women—either because they appeared defenseless, or because they dared to defend their 
homes.  
In another memorable incident, a new mother lay dead inside a house that was 
ordered burned, “and although they were shown the dead body, they plied the torch and 
burned the house.”  A neighbor had the deceased woman’s “sick babe in her arms, and 
plead for the sake of the dead mother and sick child to spare that house, but it was 
unavailing.  The body. . . was hurriedly buried in the garden, and the work of destruction 
                                               
19 Rachel Cormany, The Cormany Diaries: A Northern Family in the Civil War, edited by James C. Mohr 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982), 446. 
20
 Hoke, 123.  The flag and revolver are proudly displayed in the town’s museum to this day. 
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went on.”21  Eyewitnesses sometimes exaggerated that “bundles were fired upon 
women’s backs; ladies were forced to carry back into the houses articles of clothing they 
had saved from the flames . . . aged women were locked in their rooms while their houses 
were on fire.”22  Ironically, the mayhem and destruction only resulted in one death:  an 
elderly former slave who resided in Chambersburg died from a probable heart attack 
hours after the fire, late in the day on July 30.
23
 
The northern press predictably characterized McCausland and his men as 
heartless villains.  One short article from the Franklin Repository claimed that, when 
asked where he was born, “M’Causland said he was from hell.  For a verification of his 
statement witness Chambersburg in ruins.”24  The New York Herald described him in 
piratic terms as “a desperate, ferocious and untamed freebooter, ready at any time to 
violate the usages of honorable warfare in order to gratify his dark and malignant 
passions.”  Of the destruction itself, the paper said, “The citizens without protest had 
submitted to plunder, and had even appealed to the mercy of the rebels, but nothing could 
appease the butcher and incendiary McCausland.”25  A Connecticut newspaper described 
the Chambersburg fire as an act “of wanton and diabolical destruction, instigated by the 
same fiendish impulses which prompted. . . other barbarities that have marked the 
                                               
21 Schneck, 24.  All direct quotes have been written as they appear in the transcriptions or originals; 
spelling and grammar mistakes are consistent with transcriptions and, presumably, original manuscripts. 
22 John K. Shryock, Lutheran and Missionary, August 11, 1864, reprinted in Schneck, 61.  Shryock’s 
description of women almost being burned to death deliberately is not supported in other accounts and was 
likely an exaggeration, especially since this story was included in Schneck’s book as a tool for raising relief 
funds. 
23 Alexander, 132. 
24 “Gen. M’Causland’s Nativity,” Franklin Repository, August 24, 1864.  Emphasis present in the original. 
25 “The Burning of Chambersburg,” The New York Herald, August 1, 1864, from Civil War: A Newspaper 
Perspective.  All information from The New York Herald was obtained from this database. 
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progress of the rebellion.”26  Both papers failed to mention the destruction Union armies 
had brought on southern civilians prior to this incident.   
 McCausland carried out his orders with little hesitation, but not all of his men 
agreed with the use of hard war.  A Union cavalry sergeant (dressed in civilian clothes) 
who was in Chambersburg when McCausland arrived reported that Brigadier General 
Bradley T. Johnson asked McCausland “to relent or at least give the citizens more time, 
but he was determined.”27  A handful of stories emerged from civilian eyewitness that 
paid tribute to Confederate soldiers who either refused to participate in the destruction or 
tried to aid townspeople.  Jacob Hoke remembered that a Confederate officer “cried out, 
‘See!  See!!  Oh my God!  My God!!  Has it come to this that we must be made a band of 
thieves and robbers by a man like McCausland?’  About that time another soldier came 
up, and unbuckling his sword placed it in our house and went away.”28     
Similar stories emerged from members of the community of Confederate 
resistance to the destruction.  Eliza R. Stouffer wrote from Franklin County, 
Pennsylvania—the county surrounding Chambersburg—to a friend, describing the range 
of responses the Confederate soldiers had to their orders, “Many [victims] had only 10 to 
15 minutes time given them to leave their houses, and they forbid many, to take any thing 
out some saved a few clothes, others none at all, but what they had on their backs, some 
had their clothing & money packed up, and were not allowed to take them out,” but some 
soldiers “were more merciful, & helped the women to carry out things some appeared to 
                                               
26 “Chambersburg,” Hartford Daily Courant, August 1, 1864, from America’s Historical Newspapers.  
27 Will. S. Kochersperger, August 9, 1864, OR 37, pt. I: 334-335.  Kochersperger was a sergeant in the 20th 
Pennsylvania Cavalry and was “on detached duty at headquarters of the department” at Chambersburg 
when the burning occurred. 
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be very much affected that they had come to this, one in particular I was told off [of], that 
shed tears & would not help to burn.  They took him & hand cuffed him.”29  Another 
reported that “some of the rebel officers + men that were here did not expect this 
vandalism, + they showed a good spirit—they did + would not fire any building + even 
helped people to carry out things out of their houses.  They denounced the whole 
procedure as outrageous and wicked.”30  The Franklin Repository published an entire 
article dedicated to “Humane Rebel Officers” who opposed the destruction and tried to 
aid victims.  One captain “asked a citizen as a special favor to write to his friends in 
Baltimore and acquit him of the hellish work.”  Another admitted he was “ashamed to say 
that Gen. M’Causland is my commander!”31   At least some of the soldiers with strong 
objections to the burning refused or spoke out strongly against their commanders, often at 
great personal risk.  Meanwhile, the victims of Chambersburg seemed to assess fairly the 
actions and attitudes of the raiders, when they easily could have vilified them all.  
Soldiers and civilians on opposite sides of the conflict struggled to sort out the meaning 
of the destruction. 
Hard war was new to Confederate soldiers who had largely fought a defensive 
war on their own land, and many found that they did not have a taste for destroying 
private property.  One Virginia soldier wrote home, “City fired about noon.  Saddest 
spectacle I ever witnessed to see the women and children.  This inaugurates a terrible 
                                               
29 Eliza R. Stouffer to her “Sister in Faith,” August 14, 1864, in The Valley of the Shadow.  The soldier 
who refused to participate in the burning and was arrested by his commanding officer could have been 
Colonel William Peters, whose refusal and arrest are well documented, including in Alexander, 123-4.  
30 Benjamin S. Schneck to Margaretta S. Keller and her husband, August 3, 1864, in The Valley of the 
Shadow. 
31
 “Humane Rebel Officers,” August 24, 1864, Franklin Repository. 
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system of retaliation, devastation and rapine.”32  On August 8, he reflected, “I presume 
for the present the raid is over and if God will forgive me for this I shall try and keep out 
of all future raids under the same officers. . . . ‘Tis the first and I hope it will be the last 
time I shall have to blush for CS soldiers.”33 
Not all Confederates “blushed” in shame for their army, but many soldiers 
seemed to have a common distaste for this type of raid, even if they were not directly 
involved.  A Confederate prisoner of war in Ohio reacted with typical ambivalence about 
the news coming out of Chambersburg, “Never was there before as arrant a nation of 
hypocrites and cowards as these North men—crying out against vandalism while they are 
themselves the chief vandals of the age, and boldest always when they have to wage war 
against unarmed citizens and defenseless women and children.”  He echoed many 
southerners’ responses to news of the raid but went on to explain the complexity of his 
reaction, 
I do not justify the burning of Chambersburg, for I would feel much 
prouder of my country to see her scorn to stoop to an unworthy method of 
retaliation or revenge; but at the same time, I can not express my contempt 
and disgust at the spectacle of the whole yankee nation lifting up hands of 
holy horror at the burning of one small village, while they have been 
chanting Te Deums most devoutly for four years over the wide-spread 
desolation they have caused in the South.
34
 
Soldiers who did not condone the burning of Chambersburg nonetheless recognized it as 
an effective means of bringing the war home to the enemy and may have felt that the 
Union had brought the destruction upon itself as recompense for its own use of hard war 
tactics. 
                                               
32 Diary of Achilles Tynes, July 29, 1864, The Valley of the Shadow. Tynes’ diary must be dated 
incorrectly, as the burning occurred on July 30. 
33 Tynes, August 8, 1864. 
34
 Diary of Daniel Robinson Hundley, August 1, 1864, from The American Civil War: Letters and Diaries.  
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The Chambersburg raid elicited criticism from Confederate officers as well who 
were not with McCausland during the event.  Lieutenant Henry Kyd Douglas reflected on 
the burning years later, “Whether this kind of warfare, the destruction of private property, 
is excusable, when not necessary for the protection of an army, may be debatable.  The 
provocation in this case was so great that it has not been questioned; but neither in 
principle nor policy can I see any good reason for such retaliation.”35  Confederate 
General John B. Gordon lamented that the incident “blurred and blackened” the war’s 
history with “such ugly records of widespread and pitiless desolation.”36  The fact that 
both Douglas and Gordon openly criticized the destruction years after the war reveals the 
strong impression it left on them, especially since they were eyewitnesses themselves. 
J. Kelly Bennette did participate in the raid on Chambersburg, and in his diary, he 
revealed the uncertainty that many other soldiers must have felt about carrying out their 
unusual orders: 
The burning of Chambersburg was generally condemned by our Regt. at 
first when all the sympathies were all aroused, but when reason had time 
to regain her seat I believe that they all thought as I thought at first; that it 
was Justice & Justice tempered with Mercy.  That burning per se is wrong 
no one can deny. . . . Thru several times since the beginning of this war we 
have had opportunities of laying waste northern cities & private property 
generally.  But instead of this we have pursued toward them a course 
uniformally conciliatory hoping by this means to set the war on a civilized 
footing & thus protect our defenceless [sic] ones at home.  Orders were 
issued that private property must be respected as we came not to pillage & 
destroy but to conquer a peace.
37
  
                                               
35 Henry Kyd Douglas, I Rode with Stonewall (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 303. 
36 John Brown Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904), 306. 
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 Diary of J. Kelly Bennette, July 30, 1864, from The Valley of the Shadow.   
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Bennette’s reaction reflects the change in policy toward private property that occurred on 
both sides in the summer of 1864—Union and Confederate officers began to practice 
hard war, though in varying degrees.   
Bennette considered the destruction Yankee armies had caused all the way from 
New Orleans to Virginia, and he found the Confederacy’s conciliatory policies lacking.  
He concluded, “Now everyone knows that the conciliatory policy has failed—utterly 
failed--& we are driven nolens volens to the opposite mode of procedure.”  Bennette also 
believed that Confederate raiders compared favorably to their Union counterparts,  
Instead of snatching from the hands of the ladies what they had saved 
from their burning houses & throwing it back into the flames as the 
Yankees did. . . our men could be seen all over the city checking the fire 
or carrying trunks, bundles &c. for the ladies.  How beautiful the contrast!   
He acknowledged that “there were some who having become drunk seemed to glory in 
spreading destruction but it must also be remembered that many of them have had strong 
provocation.”38  Bennette exaggerated his comrades’ chivalry, as many Confederate 
soldiers willingly carried out their orders to plunder, threaten, and destroy.  Gilmor 
explained the issue, “Hitherto the fires had been applied to the houses of my friends, 
which roused within me feelings of the sternest vengeance. . . yet my pity was highly 
excited in behalf of these poor unfortunates, who were made to suffer for acts perpetrated 
by the officers of their own government.”39  The Confederacy may not have consciously 
altered its policy toward civilians, but the traditional rules protecting private property 
were clearly softening on both sides.  General John Imboden spoke for many southerners 
when he justified Chambersburg’s destruction.  After the war he wrote, “When goaded to 
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madness, remuneration was demanded at their [the people of Chambersburg’s] hands by 
General Early, and upon its refusal retaliation was inflicted on the nearest community that 
could be reached, and it was their misfortune to be that community.”40  
 The southern press expressed considerably less doubt about the destruction in 
Pennsylvania.  A Richmond paper wrote, “A course of duty no longer to be neglected or 
delayed will forever justify the burning of Chambersburg.  This is but the beginning of 
the end.  We know that this burning will render you [the Union] more cruel than ever.”41  
The Lynchburg Virginian rejoiced at the news coming out of Pennsylvania, “We have 
heard of nothing during the war that has given us more real pleasure—the only regret we 
feel being that a dozen towns of Pennsylvania are not included in the conflagration.  But 
we have made a good beginning and McCausland has inaugurated the true system.”42  
Another reported, “This carries the war home to the doors of the Yankees, and is a good 
retaliation for the burning of Jacksonville, Florida; Jackson, Mississippi, and other cities 
in the South.”43  Days later, the editor unleashed a ferocious attack on the recent victims:  
Vengeance has come at last, and it has come in a form so terrible that the 
Yankee heart is appalled at its aspect.  We love to hear these cries of 
anguish. . . . Glad are we that retribution has at last put forth its terrible 
arm and assumed its most terrible shape. We hope it will not stop here. We 
hope it will be pushed to the farthest extremity to which it is capable of 
going. . . . No sight could be more agreeable to our eyes than to behold 
every part of Yankeedom within reach of our armies converted into a mass 
of ashes.
44
  
Newspaper editors in Virginia had lived through four years of fear that the enemy would 
sack and burn their own towns, and they had witnessed firsthand the destruction the 
                                               
40 J.D. Imboden, “Fire, Sword, and the Halter,” in The Annals of the Civil War, 183.   
41 “Opinion of the Rebel Press,” Franklin Repository, August 24, 1864. 
42 “The Burning of Chambersburg,” Lynchburg Virginian, August 8, 1864. 
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Union Army wrought on the South.  They could more easily applaud and encourage 
destruction on the northern homefront when they themselves did not bear responsibility 
for lighting the torches.  In addition, they sought to inflame southern resistance as the 
Confederate Army faced increasing desperation on the field. 
 The question of where the blame lay for the burning arose almost as soon the 
enemy left town.  Chambersburg resident Reverend Benjamin S. Schneck became the 
most prolific chronicler of the burning, not only penning letters to friends and family 
describing the burning, but also publishing a short book titled The Burning of 
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in which he described himself as “an eye-witness and a 
sufferer,” having lost his own home to the flames.  Schneck’s eyewitness account became 
very popular, citing the most inflammatory stories that emerged from witnesses and 
victims and describing the townspeople as longsuffering but optimistic victims.  The 
publication soon had to be reprinted to meet demand.  The book listed the buildings 
destroyed in Chambersburg, along with the estimated value of each, so it became a 
valuable tool for raising funds to rebuild.   
Schneck blamed the destruction on the highest echelons of leadership in the 
Confederacy, citing the witness of a local attorney who saw the order from Early to burn 
the town.  Schneck reasoned, “The burning of Chambersburg was therefore by an order 
from one of the corps commanders of General Lee’s army, instead of the work of a 
guerrilla chief, thus placing the responsibility squarely upon the shoulders of General 
Lee.”45  The local paper agreed with Schneck’s assessment, adding,  
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When a corps commander under special orders from Gen. Lee, 
deliberately directs a town to be sacked and destroyed by fire, without 
even the pretext that any of its citizens had violated the accepted rules of 
civilized warfare, the government can do no less than bring the rebel 
authorities to the strictest accountability for the act.
46
   
No evidence links Lee to the burning or suggests that he either gave orders 
relating to the destruction or even knew about it until after the fact.  Early claimed full 
responsibility in his memoirs, “I, alone, am responsible, as the officers engaged in it were 
simply executing my orders, and had no discretion left them.  Notwithstanding the lapse 
of time which has occurred and the result of the war, I see no reason to regret my conduct 
on this occasion.”47  Lee left no personal letters mentioning the burning of 
Chambersburg, and Early took his silence on the issue as approval:  “General Lee never 
in any manner indicated disapproval of my act, and his many letters to me expressive of 
confidence and friendship forbade the idea that he disapproved of my conduct on that 
occasion.”48  Early commonly inflated his relationship with Lee in his postwar writings, 
so only Lee himself could say what his true opinion was.   
In Lee’s defense, Gordon argued, “It was a source of special and poignant pain to 
General Lee that the very town in which this order was penned and issued should 
become, at a later period, the scene of retaliatory action.”49 Lee did write to Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis just five days after the fire, reporting that McCausland had 
been to Chambersburg, but he did not mention the destruction, which he would certainly 
have heard about by that date.
50
  On the same day that McCausland laid waste to 
                                               
46 “Wanted—A Policy,” Franklin Repository, August 24, 1864. 
47 Early, 404. 
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Chambersburg, Union troops exploded a mine under Confederate breastworks at 
Petersburg, and Lee was understandably occupied with the more pressing matter of 
preventing Richmond’s capture.  Lee seems to have been unaware of Early’s intentions 
before the raid; one can only guess what his feelings were once he learned of the 
outcome.  At any rate, the ransom and burning of northern towns was never repeated by 
the Confederate Army, so it is unlikely that Lee embraced Early’s tactics as a plausible 
war policy, especially since Confederate soldiers never made their way north again 
during the war. 
Although Early willingly claimed responsibility for the raid, many northerners 
also blamed Union generals Couch and Averell.  Couch’s Department of the 
Susquehanna bore responsibility for the defense of southern Pennsylvania, and Averell’s 
cavalry had spent the fateful morning of July 30 in Greencastle, only ten miles from 
Chambersburg.  Averell had also participated in Hunter’s Raid in Lexington, Virginia and 
was widely reported by his own men to have opposed the burnings there.  
Correspondence between the two shows Couch’s concern about Confederates in the area, 
yet he struggled to get a timely response from Averell.  Around 3:30 a.m. on July 30, 
Averell received two telegrams from Couch.  The first read, “The enemy are just at the 
edge of town.  Let me know what you intend doing.”51  The second telegram followed 
immediately, with an increasing sense of urgency:  “The enemy are advancing on the 
Loudon pike.  Let me know what you intend doing.  I will endeavor to hold the town until 
daylight.”52  As residents of Chambersburg strove to understand why their town had been 
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targeted and not protected, many naturally questioned the army’s sluggish response to the 
crisis.   
Averell’s reluctance to ride the short distance to defend Chambersburg defied 
logic.  Emma V. Stouffer repeated a rumor regarding Averell in a letter to her brother,   
Some attach great blame to gens Couch and Averel.  The former some 
persons say should have rallied the 1500 men who went through here on 
Friday eve, and the latter was so drunk in GreenCastle that he could not 
write an answer to a dispatch sent him by Couch.  It is hard to tell where 
the blame rests it surely is a shame that so few should come in & do so 
much damage.
53
   
One Union report to Couch and Governor Curtin stated plainly, “Averell’s force was 
within eight miles, between Greencastle and Fayetteville, during Friday [July 29] night 
and Saturday [the day of the burning], and did not enter Chambersburg until 3 p.m.”54  
Lincoln’s former Secretary of War Simon Cameron--then chairman of the Committee of 
Public Safety--complained to the president from the state capital of Harrisburg, “Rebels 
entered Chambersburg at 3 o’clock this morning. . . . This is fifty miles from here.  Send 
us a general fit to command, and we will try to take care of ourselves.  General Couch is 
said to be at Bedford.”55  Couch curtly replied that Cameron’s request would “be 
productive of more injury than good unless the State looks to Harrisburg to furnish all of 
the men for her defense.”56  Civilians felt that their trust in the Union Army had been 
sorely misplaced. 
One Chambersburg newspaper exonerated Couch and assigned blame to a higher 
level of authority:  “Chambersburg was the ‘Headquarters of the Military Department of 
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the Susquehanna’. . . . If it was worth establishing and dignifying with the title of a 
‘Military Department’ it was worth defending, but that obvious sequen[c]e seems never 
to have entered the military combinations of the brainless blunderers at Washington.”  In 
case the higher-ups in Washington missed the point, the article clarified, “To the stupidity 
of the War Department must we lay the destruction of Chambersburg.”  The editor 
warned, “It will some day be made the subject of investigation . . . why the Shenandoah 
and Cumberland Valleys have been left as raging grounds to the rebels? . . . Why our 
towns are left unprotected that they may be ransomed to enrich the rebel 
commissariat?”57  The residents of Chambersburg expressed a strong sense of injustice 
that they were not allowed to defend themselves under the rules of war, yet they were left 
unprotected from the enemy by their own army time and again.
58
 
 Obviously, the majority of the blame for the fires rested with the Confederates.  
Logically, some of the blame went to the Union Army.  But what is most surprising is 
that many northerners outside the area also blamed the very victims of the Chambersburg 
raid for the misfortune that had befallen them.  Just four days after the burning, the 
Democratic Party-leaning newspaper The New York Herald sarcastically reported, “Their 
town has suffered to the extent of over a million of dollars—a sum which appears so 
stupendous in their eyes as to require a call upon the charity of the whole North.  We 
think, however, that this is a case which ought to be left exclusively to the charity of 
Pennsylvania.”  The article explained, “We of New York can have very little 
commiseration for a community of six thousand people who have, without a show of 
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resistance from a solitary inhabitant, permitted their town to be entered, plundered and set 
on fire in fifty places by a contemptible squad of less than five hundred rebel 
ragamuffins.”  Even more dramatically, the author opined, “There is no excuse for the 
people of Chambersburg.  They were abundantly warned of their danger months ago, and 
if they decided to trust to luck. . . in facing armed rebels, they have paid the penalty of 
their folly.”  The article concluded, “Charity, in all such unsatisfactory cases as this 
Chambersburg misfortune, ought to begin at home.  Indeed, as a case for charity, this 
affair should not be paraded before the world.” 59     
In a similarly “uncharitable” tone, a later article from the same newspaper blamed 
Chambersburg civilians for trusting their protection to “the blundering administration at 
Washington.”  Furthermore, “they have not done their duty towards their own protection, 
and they must therefore bear the burden of the responsibility for their late disasters.”  
While the article called for relief for “the helpless women and children among them,” it 
warned, “Let not the people of Pennsylvania cry again to Hercules until they have put 
their own shoulders to the wheel.”60  By mid-1864, New Yorkers felt certain that 
Confederate raiders would not target them, making it safe for them to condemn the 
Pennsylvania town that lay less than twenty miles from the Mason-Dixon Line and the 
enemy on the other side of it.  In addition, The New York Herald tended toward only 
nominal unionism and veered treacherously close to supporting the southern cause in its 
editorial views, especially for a northern newspaper.   
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In the midst of newspaper hyperbole, one African American Union soldier wrote 
to his sister back home in Chambersburg and echoed the New York press, criticizing the 
“men in Chambersburg that would let two hundred rebels come and burn the place for I 
am a soldier myself and I know what fighting is the compy [company] that I belong to 
has 80 sume [some] men in it and I know that we can Wipe the best 200 rebels that thay 
[sic] can fetch to us or let us get where thay [sic] are.”61  The noncombatants in 
Chambersburg could not win; if they had fought back, they would have been subject to 
treatment as guerillas, and since they did not fight back, outsiders labeled them cowards. 
 The Chambersburg newspaper did fight back and attempted to resurrect the 
town’s reputation from the scurrilous assault by The New York Herald.  In an open letter 
“To the Editor of the New York Herald,” the editor of the Valley Spirit wrote, “Scarce an 
adequate idea can be formed of what hellish wickedness has been perpetrated upon us 
without actual observation.  And let me say that without the knowledge of the facts, it is 
impardonable cruelty for editors to comment upon our condition, throwing the odium and 
blame upon ourselves.”  The article explained that the people of Chambersburg were 
entitled to protection from Confederate raids, something they had experienced more than 
once during the war:   
It may be very pleasant for people in the east secure from danger to scorn 
and sneer at those in this valley and laugh at their apparent timidity.  But if 
they were made to feel the hand of the invader as we have repeatedly, they 
might appreciate sympathy quite as well and hurl back the indignities and 
opprobrium endeavored to be fastened upon them.
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It seems a fair response, as Chambersburg was so often in the line of fire, and New York 
was not. 
Despite the disparaging remarks from their fellow countrymen, the townspeople 
of Chambersburg resolved to rebuild their town.  They asked for—and received—aid 
from townspeople whose property was not damaged, as well as from other northerners.  
The need was great.  A full month after the burning, the Valley Spirit reported, 
“Everything has changed since the burning.  Business is all conducted in little shops and 
shanties on the back streets, and in out of the way places. . . . One would scarcely 
suppose that so great a change could take place in a community in so short a time.”  The 
editor pessimistically lamented that, despite a state grant of $100,000, “The prospects of 
re-building the town . . . look exceedingly dark just now. . . . The contributions from 
other places will not amount to much in the way of relieving the many wants of the 
people. . . . How the people are to live this winter God only knows.”63  Reverend Schneck 
was much more optimistic, in spite of the fact that the raid had rendered him homeless:  
I have not witnessed such an absence of despondent feeling under great 
trials and sudden reverses of earthly fortune, never such buoyancy and 
vigor of soul, and even cheerfulness amid accumulated woes and sorrows, 
as I have during these four weeks of our devastated town. . . . you seldom 
see a sad or somber countenance on the street. . . . in a general way the 
sufferers by this wholesale devastation are among the most patient, 
unmurmuring, cheerful, hopeful people I have ever known.  God really 
seems to have given special grace in a special time of need.
64
   
Many outsiders eagerly helped.  A Boston newspaper reprinted an article from 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, stating that “a train, heavily laden with commissary stores was 
despatched from this city [Harrisburg] this morning to Chambersburg to relieve the 
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present wants of homeless women and children, who now crowd the surrounding fields 
and woods.”65  The same day the editor of The New York Herald began his anti-
Chambersburg rant, his paper also ran a short note about the contributions 
Chambersburg’s neighbors were making:  “At one town the trains arrived just about 
dinner time, when there was a general cleaning out of dinners; that is, the people took the 
dinners which they had prepared for themselves from off the tables and actually sent 
them away to Chambersburg to help feed the needy there.” 66  Perhaps the most 
inspirational view of Chambersburg’s future came from an August 24 article in the 
Franklin Repository:  “Dark as is the hour, let us not forget that it has the promise of 
future prosperity to our town. . . . One and all let us resolve that Chambersburg shall be 
rebuilt, that her population shall again sit down in prosperity where rebel brutality made 
withering desolation, and when once resolved upon, the good work will be more than half 
done.”67  The devastation of property had not devastated the people’s spirit and will to 
continue the war.   
The Chambersburg burning created a topic for political debate as well.  An article 
from the Valley Spirit in late August reprinted a report from the Harrisburg Telegraph 
that “several citizens of Chambersburg have become insane on account of the loss of their 
entire effects by the late Rebel fire in that town.”  The town’s Democratically-aligned 
paper saucily replied, “It is true . . . that some of our citizens have been slightly deranged 
ever since the breaking out of the rebellion, but we are happy to say that they are rapidly 
recovering and are expected to be sufficiently sane to vote for the nominees of the 
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Democratic party at the next election.”68  The editor implied their “derangement” caused 
them to support Abraham Lincoln’s Republican Party, but since they had recovered their 
sanity, they would vote for the opposition in the upcoming presidential election.  Perhaps 
the fact that they had retained their sense of humor was the best barometer of the town’s 
health following the devastation. 
 Northern civilians struggled to find meaning in the destruction of Chambersburg, 
as people do in such situations.  The day after the fire, the New York Herald asked, 
Is this a wholesale life or death invasion of the North, with the temporary 
relinquishment of Richmond, in the hope to conquer a peace at 
Philadelphia?  Is it a mere raid?  Or is it a more extended attempt at the 
counter irritant strategy by which in the late advance on Washington the 
enemy hoped to draw Grant from the James river? . . . We suppose the 
counter irritant view to be the correct one.  We believe that Lee could 
make this strategy very formidable to the North, and we believe that he 
could easily overdo it.
69
 
People in Pennsylvania or New York--or any northern state, for that matter—could not be 
certain what the Chambersburg raid portended for their future, whether it was the 
beginning of a string of Confederate invasions and burnings in the North or an isolated 
event.  Most northerners, though, seemed to sense that they were safe from future attacks.   
On August 7, under the title “Curious Fact,” the New York Herald related, 
“Although an enemy is reported upon the border, threatening another raid, still the 
citizens between here and Harrisburg do not seem to be any more anxious or prepared to 
arm themselves than they were before Chambersburg was in ruins.”70  A Union soldier 
whose wife had braved the destruction and saved their home in Chambersburg by falsely 
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claiming to be a widow noted in his diary that his wife was still frightened, “but the raid 
is over and I am so happy to know there will not soon be another, and that my precious 
ones are safe and sound.”71  A continuing sense of security distinguished the experience 
of northern civilians from that of southern civilians under hard war.  By August 1864, 
southerners who lived in the general vicinity of the Union Army came to expect that their 
homes and personal possessions would be destroyed by the enemy.  They may not have 
anticipated having their roofs burned over their heads, but they knew that their crops, 
livestock, and foodstuffs were vulnerable and became efficient in hiding valuables as the 
enemy approached.   
Hard war became a more viable policy for the Union Army than it ever did for the 
Confederates, who spent the vast majority of the war on their own soil and whose only 
invasions into the North ended in defeat.  The burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania 
understandably shocked northerners, and at the time, comments such as “Modern history 
affords but few parallels of a deed so atrocious and unnecessary,” became commonplace 
in the North, but in reality, hard war devastated the South far more, simply because of the 
broad swath of destruction.  The newspaper correctly asserted that “similar offences” by 
Union troops in the Shenandoah Valley were “committed in a smaller degree”; 72 
however, the compound effect of four years of fighting and foraging along with the 
burning in parts of Virginia made the outcome far worse than in Chambersburg. 
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 The Confederate generals who ordered and executed the destruction stoutly 
defended their decision.  Early reportedly made the following comments on August 6, 
1864:   
General Hunter in his recent raid to Lynchburg, caused wide-spread ruin 
wherever he passed.  I followed him about sixty miles, and language 
would fail me to describe the terrible desolation which marked his path. . . 
. Such things of course, cannot be long endured, and must provoke 
retaliation whenever it is possible. . . . I was very reluctant [to order the 
burning of Chambersburg], and it was a most disagreeable duty, to inflict 
such damage on these citizens; but I deemed it an imperitive [sic] 
necessity to show the people of the Federal States that war has two sides.
73
 
McCausland also described the raid as “an act of retaliation perfectly justified by the 
circumstances,” insisting it “was at all times kept clearly within the rule governing 
civilized warfare.”74  Both sides were testing and revising the rules of “civilized warfare.” 
Yet, hard war tactics on northern soil yielded fewer results.  McCausland did not 
receive the compensation he and Early claimed to seek from Chambersburg, and the 
destruction did not cripple the North’s will to continue fighting.  Rather, McCausland’s 
raid fueled the town’s desire to continue.  The Franklin Repository responded to the 
destruction the next day, 
There was a time when we believed in the boasted chivalry of the South, 
when we were proud of their brave deeds, even when we struggled with 
them, for we looked upon them as misguided Americans, but this last 
wholesale act of vandalism has extinguished every spark of respect for 
them as men.  Let us fight this unholy war to the bitter end, and palsied be 
the tongue that speaks of peace other than upon the grounds of 
unconditional submission to the arms of the United States of North 
America.
75
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General Grant condemned the burning of Chambersburg, “a purely defenceless [sic] town 
with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications.”  The destruction in Pennsylvania seems 
to have influenced his decision immediately thereafter to appoint General Philip H. 
Sheridan to command Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley, “with instructions to put 
himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death.  Wherever the enemy goes let 
our troops go also.”76      
The burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania was a failed, final attempt to expose 
northern civilians to the horrors of war that had plagued southerners since the war began.  
Though Early and McCausland assumed the blessing of southern civilians in their brief 
campaign of revenge and retaliation, many Confederate participants expressed profound 
regret for the destruction and questioned the results.  For the townspeople of 
Chambersburg—much like their counterparts in Lexington--the fires knocked them down 
but not out, and their resilience carried them through to a successful conclusion in the 
war.  One prominent resident aptly expressed the spirit that propelled the town into the 
future, “This wretched war cannot last forever and I have an abiding faith that good old 
Chambersburg will be in the future, as it has been in the past, the first and best of all 
places to live.”77  Twenty years after the burning, Jacob Hoke reported, “The 
Chambersburg of to-day, which arose from the ashes of the Chambersburg of the past, as 
is conceded by all, is the handsomest town of the Cumberland Valley.  If it has its equal 
anywhere in any town of its size, east or west, I have never seen it.”78 
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Chapter 3: Sheridan’s Raid on Dayton 
When news of the destruction in Chambersburg reached Rockingham County in 
the southern Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, the local newspaper expressed concern 
about reprisals: 
[Union soldiers] have burned whole towns; they have burned private 
residences; they have burned mills; they have burned churches; and even 
now they are doing their utmost to shell and to burn some of our chief 
towns. . . . We hope and pray that the burning of Chambersburg may put a 
stop to burning elsewhere.  If it does not, however, we hope the 
Confederates will again apply the torch.
1
  
Although the journalist for the Rockingham Register could not have known that much of 
his own county would lie in ashes only two months later, he seemed to sense that the war 
was changing.  The burning of Chambersburg served as a gateway for increased 
destruction in the South.    
By late summer, though, the local press still gloated about the Valley’s security.  
In August, the Lynchburg paper presumed to advise President Lincoln on his war 
strategy:  “The Yankees should quit raiding.  They don’t pay well for the investment, and 
are only a temporary inconvenience in one respect, while they are an absolute blessing in 
intensifying the hatred of the people for the foe who are making war upon us.” 2  Almost 
one month later, Valley journalists remained optimistic as they assessed their situation, 
“We are still safe; our means of sustaining life are still abundant; and our gallant soldiers 
still stand as a wall. . . between us and the meanest, vilest foe that ever disgraced the 
name of our common humanity.  We cannot be too grateful that we have been spared this 
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last cup of suffering and distress prepared for us by the enemy.”3  Residents of the Valley 
understood that they sat in the war’s path, but they avoided panic because they had 
confidence in Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early and his dwindling army of 
14,000 men to protect the agriculturally-rich Valley, his main source of supplies. 
In June 1864, newspapers reported optimistically on the coming harvest, “The 
grass and the grain looks unusually promising, whilst the corn and the fruit trees fairly 
laugh and clap their hands at the prospects of filling to overflowing the measure of the 
good of a bounteous and beneficent Providence.”4  Yet the vaunted abundance of 
foodstuffs increased tension within the community by August.  Social conflict was not a 
new phenomenon in Rockingham County in 1864.  The large minority of religious, 
nonslaveholding pacifists who lived and farmed in the region—mostly Quakers, 
Brethren, and Mennonites—distinguished themselves through the plain dress and 
conservative social practices they inherited from their Pennsylvania Dutch forebears, but 
their refusal to serve in the Confederate Army had caused a new rift with their neighbors 
as soon as the war broke out.   
Valley residents who had sent sons and husbands off to fight resented the 
religious exemption that pacifist church members enjoyed from the government in 
Richmond, especially since many of the conscientious objectors also supported the Union 
cause.
5
  As the yearly harvest approached, a contributor to the Rockingham Register 
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writing under the pseudonym of “Several Who See” accused religious exemptees of 
inflating prices on food.  The article read, 
You are professedly a Christian people, and charity—not to speak of 
humanity—is one of the highest attributes of a Christian.  You are rich, 
and have been abundantly blessed in most all respects.  You are too 
conscientious (religiously) to engage in battle for the freedom and liberty 
of your country.  Is it not curious that you are not too conscientious to ask 
an hundred fold that worth of your produce?
6
  
Newspaper editors boasted about patriotism and Providence, but the community showed 
the strain of impending invasion. 
Meanwhile, Union General Ulysses S. Grant planned to put an end to General 
Robert E. Lee’s use of the Shenandoah Valley as the “Breadbasket of the Confederacy.”  
As early as July 14—two weeks before the Confederate destruction of Chambersburg-- 
Grant wrote a letter to Major General Henry Halleck explaining that Union troops would 
“eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the 
balance of this season will have to carry their provender with them.”7  After the burning 
of Chambersburg on July 30, Grant articulated the details of a significant invasion of the 
Valley.  The destruction in Pennsylvania became the last straw in a series of frustrations 
that Early had caused the Union Army in the Second Valley Campaign.  Although Grant 
found himself tied down in Petersburg against Lee, he took time to make necessary 
adjustments to the Union command in the Shenandoah Valley.  In his postwar memoirs, 
Grant explained that Early’s army had been “free to supply themselves with horses, beef 
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cattle, and. . . provisions.”  Grant  wrote, “I determined to put a stop to this.  I started 
Sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another 
division of his cavalry.”8  General Philip Sheridan’s appointment signaled a major change 
in strategy for the Union Army in the Valley. 
 Sheridan had served with Grant in the western theatre of the war before both were 
called east to help defeat Lee.  He had earned a reputation as a brave and headstrong 
officer at Chickamauga, but at only thirty-three years of age, his youth and inexperience 
concerned Secretary of War Edwin Stanton.  Grant nevertheless insisted on his 
appointment to head the newly-created Middle Military Division, and in early August, 
Sheridan and his 26,000-man Army of the Shenandoah set out for the Valley of Virginia 
to take on Early.
9
 
 Shortly after his promotion, Sheridan received grim orders from his commander.  
Grant ordered, “Give the enemy no rest. . . . Do all the damage to railroads and crops you 
can.  Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes [slaves], so as to prevent further 
planting.  If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a 
barren waste.”10  Grant intended for Sheridan to carry out the plans he had discussed the 
month before with Halleck and determined to decisively break the Confederate Army 
through military pressure and the destruction of supplies. 
 In mid-September, Sheridan defeated Early’s much smaller force at the Third 
Battle of Winchester and the Battle of Fisher’s Hill on the northern end of the 
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Shenandoah Valley.  Early quickly retreated south, and Sheridan followed, prepared to 
execute Grant’s orders to lay waste to the Valley.  When Sheridan arrived in the Valley, 
his men began destroying barns, haystacks, and mills—any supplies that would help feed 
Early’s army—and driving off and slaughtering livestock.  Sheridan agreed with Grant’s 
assessment that the Valley had to be destroyed.  After the war he wrote, “[Grant] had 
rightly concluded that it was time to bring the war home to a people engaged in raising 
crops from a prolific soil to feed the country’s enemies. . . .   I endorsed the programme 
[sic] in all its parts.”   
In later years, Sheridan reflected on the nature of war itself,  
“I do not hold war to mean simply that lines of men shall engage each 
other in battle. . . . Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see but 
little of the horrors. . . and even grow indifferent to them. . . . It is another 
matter, however, when deprivation and suffering are brought to their own 
doors.   
Sheridan echoed Grant’s belief that civilian suffering would bring a quicker end to the 
conflict:  “Death is popularly considered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is 
not; reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and quickly than does the 
destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man has demonstrated in more than one 
great conflict.”11  Sheridan neglected to mention that his enthusiasm for hard war was 
tempered with great restraint late in the Second Valley Campaign.    
In addition to trying to end the war quickly, Sheridan had another reason for 
stripping the Valley of its food supply:  guerillas.  Guerillas threatened and harassed the 
Union Army in the Valley from every direction, and Sheridan’s men found it unnerving, 
many of them mentioning it in their diaries and letters.  A Vermont chaplain who served 
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with Sheridan wrote, “The people were meek-faced citizens by day, and in the presence 
of any considerable body of Union troops; but as soon as the troops were out of sight, 
when darkness came on, they became desperate and bloodthirsty guerrillas; and in this 
character they stole upon our men like savages.”12  The tense situation around 
Harrisonburg portended disaster for one of the town’s rural outposts. 
 The tragic and mysterious death of one of Sheridan’s favorite officers exacerbated 
the destruction the Union Army had begun in Rockingham County.  Lieutenant John 
Rodgers Meigs had earned respect as a seasoned army veteran by October 1864.  The 
twenty-three-year-old son of the Union Army’s Quartermaster General Montgomery C. 
Meigs entered the army in 1863 after graduating first in his class at West Point.  Serving 
with General David Hunter in the Lexington Raid in June 1864, Meigs left his youthful 
mark on Virginia Military Institute by vandalizing the debating society’s book and 
capturing the school’s statue of Washington.  Meigs later served as the chief engineer of 
the Department of West Virginia and had become a valuable asset as an expert on the 
Valley’s topography.  On August 15, Sheridan selected him to be one of his aide-de-
camps.
13
  He later described Meigs as “gallant” and said he “was endeared to me on 
account of his invaluable knowledge of the country, his rapid sketching, his great 
intelligence, and his manly and soldierly qualities.”14  Sheridan’s admiration of young 
Meigs explains much of what occurred that October outside Harrisonburg. 
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 On October 3, Meigs and two other Union soldiers, William Cutterson and James 
A. Garringston, conducted a reconnaissance near Dayton, a rural village five miles south 
of Harrisonburg, where many of Rockingham County’s Unionists lived.  Meigs and his 
companions encountered three men on horseback who were wearing black oilcloths in the 
early evening drizzle, making it difficult to identify them.  The details of what occurred 
next varied according to the source.  The Confederate version held that the three 
unknown horsemen were in fact Confederate scouts George Martin and F. M. Campbell 
of the Fourth Virginia Cavalry and Benjamin Franklin (“Frank”) Shaver of the First 
Virginia Cavalry.   
According to sources closely connected to Shaver, the Confederate soldiers saw 
three Union soldiers approach on horseback.  When one of the men suggested outpacing 
them, Shaver, who was less than a mile from his home, replied, “No, by our riding 
leisurely along they may take us for citizens and not follow us up this road.”  Shaver 
remembered a gap in the fence up ahead and suggested riding through it to the woods to 
evade the enemy.  When the Union soldiers followed them onto Swift Run Gap Road, 
they sped up to get through the gap but found that it was closed.  “Campbell asked, ‘Shall 
we run or fight?’  Shaver replied, ‘Fight.’”  When the Union cavalrymen reached them, 
they “challenged them as d---d rebels, to surrender.  The Confederates immediately 
wheeled, and each party fired almost simultaneously.”  Shaver struggled to gain control 
of his mare, and as she “darted past” Meigs, Shaver shot him in the head with his pistol at 
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close range, killing him instantly.  The Confederate trio captured a second man, and the 
third escaped on foot.
15
 
 Unfortunately, Sheridan received a very different report about Meigs’ death.  
With Meigs dead and one companion captured, Cutterson returned alone to headquarters 
and reported that the scouting party had been ambushed by guerillas who had killed 
Meigs in cold blood.
16
  Sheridan reported to Grant, “Lieut. John R. Meigs, my engineer 
officer, was murdered beyond Harrisonburg, near Dayton.  For this atrocious act all the 
houses within an area of five miles were burned.”  He explained, “Since I came into the 
Valley, from Harper’s Ferry up to Harrisonburg, every train, every small party, and every 
straggler has been bushwhacked by people, many of whom have protection papers from 
commanders who have been hitherto in this valley.”17  In his 1888 memoirs, Sheridan 
continued to insist that Meigs’ death was the work of guerillas:   
[Meigs] overtook three men dressed in our uniform.  From their dress, and 
also because the party was immediately behind our lines and within a mile 
and a half of my headquarters, Meigs and his assistants naturally thought 
that they were joining friends, and wholly unsuspicious of anything to the 
contrary, rode on with the three men some little distance; but their perfidy 
was abruptly discovered by their suddenly turning upon Meigs with a call 
for his surrender. . . . one of the topographers. . . reported a few minutes 
later at my headquarters that Meigs was killed without resistance of any 
kind whatever, and without even the chance to give himself up. . . . The 
fact that the murder had been committed inside our lines was evidence that 
the perpetrators of the crime, having their homes in the vicinity, had been 
clandestinely visiting them, and been secretly harbored by some of the 
neighboring residents.
18
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When news of Meigs’ “murder” reached Union soldiers back at the camp, they mourned 
in shock at the loss of the popular officer.  Sheridan seemed particularly devastated by 
both the death of young Meigs and the manner in which he died.  Guerilla activity was a 
serious matter, and Sheridan promptly ordered the burning of every house in a five mile 
radius of the spot where Meigs fell.  He explained his motives after the war, 
Determining to teach a lesson to these abettors of the foul deed—a lesson 
they would never forget—I ordered all the houses within an area of five 
miles to be burned.  General Custer, who had succeeded to the command 
of the Third Cavalry division. . . was charged with this duty, and the next 
morning proceeded to put the order into execution.
19
 
The officer on whose shoulders the order fell was Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. 
Wildes of the 116
th
 Ohio Volunteer Infantry.  Wildes had served under General David 
Hunter in Lexington during the June raid and had criticized Hunter for the vandalism of 
Washington College—though not for the burning of Virginia Military Institute.20  
Despite—or perhaps because of—their previous experience with hard war, many of the 
men expressed dismay over their new orders.  
One of the men involved was Chaplain Louis Napoleon Beaudry of the 5
th
 New 
York Cavalry.  Beaudry recorded in his August 4 diary entry, “I have looked upon the 
most awful tragic scenes I ever witnessed.”  Beaudry accompanied his regiment in the 
burning of Dayton, though he “pleaded to be relieved” from the distasteful assignment, 
confiding, “When I heard the work we had to do, I was heartsick!”  He reported that one 
officer was arrested for his refusal to participate.  Beaudry described the scene,  
                                               
19 Sheridan, 308. 
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Flanking columns were sent out into the country, burning everything they 
found, while the main column passed on the Pike, announcing the terrible 
news to the panic-stricken people.  The horror that prevails cannot be 
imagined nor described.  Two hours were given the villagers to get out of 
their houses and the column marched toward Harrisonburg, burning all 
buildings as we went. . . . More or less pillaging went on during the 
terrible carnival.
21
 
Another cavalryman, Captain Charles (“C.T.”) Van Dusen of the 8th New York Cavalry, 
expressed similar apprehension over the unit’s orders.  In his diary entry of the same date, 
he briefly noted, “Burning all the buildings within 5 miles of Dayton.  Burning in 
retaliation for Lieut. Shot last Evg. [evening] by bushwhacker.”  Van Dusen poignantly 
concluded, “Terrible sorry sight to see all buildings burning & women crying.  It is 
inhuman.”22  In spite of the soldiers’ belief that guerillas had killed Meigs, they did not 
agree that all of the neighboring civilians should pay the price. 
 Union soldiers stationed in the vicinity who did not participate in the destruction 
also provided commentary on the burning, largely criticizing Sheridan’s orders.  Future 
president Rutherford B. Hayes served as a colonel under Sheridan in the 23
rd
 Ohio, and, 
like many of his comrades in arms, he had been with Hunter in the Lexington raid, 
criticizing the destruction there in June.  Along with Van Dusen and Beaudry, he also 
mentioned the burning in his October 4
th
 diary, but unlike the previous diarists, he did not 
participate directly—and the date happened to be his forty-second birthday.  He wrote, 
“Lieutenant Meigs killed last night by guerillas, three miles south of camp.  Houses on 
the road for five miles burned by order of General Sheridan.”  He discreetly concluded, 
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“Not according to my views or feelings.”23  Hayes chose his words carefully, but he still 
managed to reveal his opinion of the destruction. 
 Others wrote home about their experiences.  Colonel Charles Russell Lowell of 
the 2
nd
 Massachusetts Cavalry came from a prominent Boston family.  Writing to his 
young wife from nearby Mt. Crawford on October 5, he described the scene the night 
before:   
[The new moon and the evening star] looked very strangely calm and 
peaceful and almost reproachful in the West. . . with the whole North and 
East, far and near, lighted up by burning barns and houses.  Lieutenant 
Meigs was shot by a guerrilla, and by order the village of Dayton and 
everything for several miles around was burned.  I am very glad my 
Brigade had no hand in it. . . . The war in this part of the country is 
becoming very unpleasant to an officer’s feelings.24   
Although these men had witnessed the effects of hard war before and though they sought 
an end to guerilla activity, they struggled with the destruction of private property, even at 
this late phase of the war.  The Union’s hard war policies seemed to be inflicting damage 
on its army’s morale. 
 The destruction could have been far worse, as the burning of Dayton ended almost 
as abruptly as it had begun.  Sheridan mentioned the sudden turn of events in his 
memoirs, “When a few houses in the immediate neighborhood of the scene of the murder 
had been burned, Custer was directed to cease his desolating work, but to fetch away all 
the able-bodied males as prisoners.”25  Why were Major-General George Custer and his 
3
rd
 Cavalry Division ordered to stop burning homes in Dayton?  The answer lies with 
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Wildes.  When he received orders to burn houses in the area, he immediately sent a 
courier to Sheridan with a message in which Wildes “urged and begged him to revoke the 
order in so far as Dayton was concerned” because of “the character of the people of the 
place”—in other words, because they were largely Unionists and religious pacifists.  
Sheridan “read the note and swore, read it again and swore, examined and cross 
examined the messenger.”  He reluctantly cancelled the order to burn the village.   
Wildes explained that Sheridan  
was in great grief over the death of his staff officer, and terribly 
determined that the people of the vicinity should suffer for his murder, for 
he well knew. . . that these bushwhacking murderers were not men of the 
rebel army, but cowardly citizens who, remaining within our lines, 
assembled together to commit such dastardly deeds as this at unguarded 
spots.
26
   
The townspeople’s loyalty to the Union saved their homes and not the discovery of facts 
surrounding Meigs’ death.  For years after the war, Montgomery C. Meigs believed that 
guerillas had murdered his son, even hiring a private detective to investigate.  The 1895 
article in Yost’s Weekly detailing Shaver’s account of the shooting noted that “efforts 
were made after the war to arrest Shaver on the charge of bushwhacking Lieut. Meigs.  
And it was only after satisfactory evidence had been furnished that he was regularly 
enrolled in the Confederate army, and was at the time acting under military orders, that 
he was left unmolested.”27 
 While Sheridan considered whether to revoke the order, soldiers remained 
unaware of the turn of events and notified residents of the order to burn their homes, 
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urging them to remove personal items to safety.  Wildes remembered the scene long after 
the war had ended,  
Such weeping and wailing as went up from the poor women and children 
of that town we hope never to hear again. .  . . The soldiers had helped the 
people carry out their goods. . . . Every house was now emptied, and the 
poor people sat among their little piles of household effects, the very 
picture of despair, awaiting the hour when their houses should be given up 
to the flames.  In the country all about them, the dense smoke now arising 
in all directions showed them that the vengeful order was being 
executed.
28
   
News eventually arrived that the original order had been rescinded, and Union soldiers 
sought out the citizens to share the good news and “help them carry back their goods.  
When they saw them coming, they thought it was to apply the torch, and the screams of 
women and children were perfectly heart rending.”29 
 When the would-be victims discovered that their homes would remain safe, 
“many of the poor women fainted,” and the children clapped their hands and shouted for 
joy.  Wildes remembered that the tidal wave of emotion “was too much for even the grim 
and sturdy old soldiers.  The sleeve of many a blouse was wet with their tears.”  The 
soldiers gladly helped the townspeople return household goods to their rightful places, 
and the citizens of Dayton prepared a feast for the soldiers who would be moving out the 
next day.  Wildes wrote, “There was not a man in the regiment who would not have faced 
death in a dozen battles rather than to have burned that village in the presence of those 
weeping, imploring and helpless women and children.”30  Wildes’ postwar memories 
may have exaggerated the emotion of the moment.  However, the fact that many diaries 
and letters from Union soldiers written at the time of the burning described dramatic 
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scenes and denounced Sheridan’s orders supports the overall message of Wildes’ 
account.  The battle-hardened veterans of the Army of the Shenandoah desired to root out 
guerillas and end the war quickly, but they did not relish destroying the property of 
defenseless women in order to accomplish the feat.   
The Rockingham Register later reported that Sheridan’s Raid, including the order 
to burn Dayton for Meigs’ death, resulted in the burning of 30 houses and 450 barns, in 
addition to the destruction of 31 mills and 100 miles of fencing.  A special committee 
appointed by the county court estimated that 100,000 bushels of wheat and 50,000 
bushels of corn had been destroyed and that over 10,000 head of livestock—including 
cattle, horses, sheep, and hogs--had been “carried off,” though many of those were 
doubtless slaughtered, according to eyewitness accounts.  These staggering losses 
represented Rockingham County alone.  The committee estimated that the total damages 
in the county amounted to $25.5 million in Confederate prices.
31
  Destruction occurred on 
two different levels and under two different sets of orders.  The larger “burning”—as the 
locals came to call it—resulted from Grant’s August orders to Sheridan, while specific 
destruction, including that of houses, generally stemmed from retaliation to guerilla 
attacks.  As eyewitnesses recorded the events that unfolded that autumn, they often 
conflated the various incidents.  Indeed, to civilians who watched their barns and homes 
burn and to soldiers who had to execute such orders, one burning hardly differed from 
another, especially in postwar memory.
32
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 Sheridan’s reluctant recall of the burning order saved countless homes from 
destruction, yet even before the new orders reached troops to cease the burning, many 
soldiers took it upon themselves to protect property.  John J. Garber was a Brethren 
church member who strongly opposed the war and undermined the Confederate Army by 
assisting deserters.  At one point, he successfully bribed his own brother into leaving the 
Confederate Army.  During the raid, “Genl. Custer gave him protection so that his 
property was not burned though his neighbors [sic] property was.”33  Custer likely 
identified Garber as a Unionist and determined to save his property in recognition of his 
loyalty to the Union.    
 A similar incident occurred while fourteen-year-old George Edgar Sipe was at a 
neighbor’s house during the raid.  Sheridan’s men rode in and set fire to the family’s barn 
and outbuildings.  When one soldier came into an upstairs bedroom and set fire to a bed, 
the daughters ran outside “screaming and wringing their hands.”  An officer rode by and 
“hearing their cries and pitiful appeals, he sprang from his horse and rushing up to the 
room plunged the point of his sword into the burning faggot and ashed it over the porch 
banisters down into the yard.  Then hastily dragging out the burning bed tick and 
coverings, he threw them down on the wet grass.”  Sipe noted the family’s appreciation; 
they “couldn’t say enough in praise of the officer who had saved the house over their 
heads.  Lucy. . . in a burst of gratitude, had hardly dried her eyes before declaring that she 
‘would love that Yankee as long as she lived.’”34  The people of Dayton were fortunate 
that the Union Army had camped in the area for over a week before Meigs’ death because 
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it gave Union soldiers like Wildes the opportunity to interact with people in the 
community.  They were then able to vouch for their loyalty when Sheridan gave the order 
to burn; Hayes had referred to the “Dunkards [Brethren] and Mennonites” as “good, quiet 
people.”35  Soldiers also found it difficult to destroy the property of people they had come 
to know—and respect.   
 The greatest restraint in the use of hard war in Dayton and the surrounding county 
ultimately came from Sheridan himself when he supplied wagons to transport refugees 
out of the Valley, even as the destruction was being carried out.  Mennonite Peter 
Hartman recalled his experiences as a young man in the Valley in 1864, and his personal 
account demonstrated the seemingly incongruous events that occurred simultaneously.  
Later in life he wrote, “We just began to realize what war was when Sheridan made his 
raid.”  Seeing soldiers coming up the Valley Pike, Hartman hurried home and saw “the 
whole farm was overrun with soldiers shooting the stock.  We had thirty fat hogs, and 
they were all killed, we thought, by the time I got home.”  The family also lost their 
chickens and sheep.  Hartman reported that “some of the people tried to ward off the 
attack by saying that they were Union men.  To this Sheridan answered that all was 
Union now.” 36  The Hartmans’ property was not spared, even though they were pacifists.   
Despite the loss, though, Hartman noted that Sheridan “sent word out all over the 
country that if any one wanted to leave the country and go north he would send teams out 
after them.”  Hartman joined the wagon train heading north to avoid serving in either 
army since he had successfully dodged Confederate conscription up to that point.  He 
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described the wagon train as having 1,600 wagons, “sixteen miles long.”  The wagon 
train went as far as Martinsburg, West Virginia, ninety miles north, and from there, 
Valley refugees had to make their own arrangements.
37
  Hartman’s estimate of the 
number of evacuee wagons must have been exaggerated, as it was not corroborated in 
other accounts.  Sheridan himself reported to Grant, “Over 400 wagon loads of refugees 
have been sent back to Martinsburg.”38  Sheridan’s actual orders pertaining to the wagon 
train are not extant, so it is difficult to discern the parameters for evacuation.  Wagons 
were certainly offered to local residents verified as Unionists and may have been supplied 
to anyone wishing to leave. 
Evidence that the Union Army was generous in its provisions for refugees 
emerged from the reminiscences of seventy-six-year-old Susie Swank.  Swank was only 
thirteen, living in Dayton with her widowed mother and four sisters when Sheridan’s 
Raid occurred; four of her brothers were away with the Confederate Army, indicating the 
family was neither pacifist nor unionist.  When Union soldiers rode up to the house, her 
mother gave them bread, and on a second visit, they asked for meat.  “She said she had 
only a small piece, hardly half of a ham,” Swank remembered.  “She gave it to them and 
they paid her for it and thanked her.  And then they told her would have to leave the 
home as they were expecting a little scrimmage.”  The women packed up a few food 
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items and left without knowing where they would go.  A Union soldier directed them 
toward the refugee wagon train.
39
   
When one of the wagon masters, also a Union officer, saw that the family of 
women had been displaced, he “spoke to the soldiers that were with him:  ‘Come boys, 
we will get for this lady what we can.’”  The wagon master drove the women back to 
their home with two wagons and ordered his men to quickly fill her mother’s chest with 
household goods and clothing.  Swank recalled that her sister saved all of her dresses, 
“but the rest of us got not any except what we had on our backs at the time.”  They also 
took “two feather beds.”  The “scrimmage” began, and the group of women and soldiers 
hurried back to the wagon train in Harrisonburg.  Swank described it as “a long wagon 
train that General Sheridan sent up the valley to take all the women and children out of 
the valley.  All that would go they took and there were more than 900 wagons and 800 
soldiers went along as guards.”40  Like Hartman, Swank overestimated the number of 
wagons, but the large number both cited reveals how impressive the wagon train must 
have looked to the young people. 
Swank’s family took their first locomotive ride ever to Dayton, Ohio.  A man in 
the depot “came in and asked ‘Is there anyone from Dayton, or Bridgewater, Virginia?  If 
so please stand up.’”  The man had lived close to Swank’s home in Dayton, though the 
family had not met him before.  He took them to his house to spend the night and then 
took them to their train the next morning as they made their way to an uncle in 
Bellefontaine, Ohio, showing that Valley residents who had previously evacuated 
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actively sought to help former neighbors.  Three members of the family remained in 
Virginia, but the rest stayed in Ohio, and Swank lived in Ohio the rest of her life.
41
   
Swank’s story demonstrates that Sheridan extended relocation services to women and 
children, at least a few of those whose families actively supported the Confederacy. 
 Some of the most gripping stories came from pacifists who left the Valley to settle 
in other Mennonite communities.  Most Mennonite and Brethren families who left 
relocated—either permanently or temporarily--to Lancaster, Pennsylvania and eastern 
Ohio where they could worship with other parishes and continue farming as they had 
done in Rockingham County.  The Herald of Truth, a monthly Mennonite newspaper 
based in Ohio, carried news of fellow believers who had become refugees in the war.  A 
man in Washington County, Maryland reported in November 1864, “A great many 
[brethren] have come over within the last few weeks.  Some have been entirely burnt out 
by the soldiers—Some have saved a few things, and some bring their families with 
them.”42  Evacuees brought stories of the devastation with them.   
 Refugees themselves also submitted letters describing the nightmare they had left 
behind in Virginia.  Michael Shank of Dayton reported that “prowlers, contrary to the 
General’s [Sheridan’s] orders, commenced pilfering robbing and plundering. . . squads of 
them. . . taking whatever suited their fancy, such as money, watches, jewelry. . . 
threatning [sic] to shoot the inmates of the house if they followed after them.”  The Shank 
family acquired wagons to load their household goods, but they were unable to save 
everything.  They made their way to Harrisonburg and waited for the wagon train to 
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leave.  Shank reported that when he went home to check on his property, he “found the 
destruction completed; the dwelling house, and barn with all their contents and all the out 
buildings were entirely consumed by the flames.  The U.S. Government then furnished us 
transportation, free of charge to Lancaster, Pa., and we are now here, living principally 
upon the charities of the brethren.”43  Shank discovered the difficult truth that leaving 
home to seek shelter elsewhere left property more vulnerable.  Soldiers seemed to find it 
far more difficult to burn homes when they had to look the victims in the face than if the 
house was unoccupied.  Despite the destruction, Mennonite accounts generally praised 
Sheridan as Shank did and refused to blame him for the destruction to their property. 
 Like Shank, fellow Mennonite Emanuel Suter temporarily relocated to Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania after the burning.  In December 1864, though, Suter had no clear 
direction for the future.  To the readers of the Herald of Truth he wrote, “I. . . left the 
once beautiful, but now desolate valley of Virginia, and am now living in this County as a 
pilgrim and a stranger not knowing where I shall next pitch my tent, or when I shall be 
able to go to my home again.”  Suter mourned the separation from friends as well as from 
home:  “This has caused me no little trouble and distress, to be separated from near and 
dear friends, brethren and sisters, so that we do not know whether we shall ever be able to 
see each other anymore in this world or not.”  He went on to write that he was 
subscribing to the paper to “see where all my brethren and sisters are, who have left the 
valley.”44  The paper became a lifeline for a community that had been ripped apart by 
war.  This was especially important for the Mennonites, who had been a close-knit 
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community united by farming and worship and who were now scattered for the 
foreseeable future. 
 Mennonite pastor D. H. Landis echoed Suter’s grief over the loss of community.  
Landis and his family relocated on October 2, just days before the burning occurred.  He 
described the sudden change that the rural county had experienced in a private letter that 
was eventually published, “We were, for the last four years, living in a somewhat 
disturbed and uneasy state of mind. . . in consequence of the national calamity that is now 
existing.”  He wrote that “the calamity grew severer” and the church found it difficult to 
worship:  “Some of our churches were destroyed so that we could not convene.”    Before 
he left, “the union army came up the Valley, sweeping every thing before them like a 
wild hurricane:  there was nothing left to eat for man or beast; neither was there any thing 
needed for beasts, as they left no beast from the horse down to the chicken:  all was 
taken.”  Despite the physical hardship, Landis worried about his congregation,  
O, how it grieves me to think of the brethren and sisters that are left back, 
who also have a desire to come out of the troubles that are there!. . . To 
think of the empty seats that are occasioned by many of us leaving, is 
painful; to think of it that when they meet to worship and find many of 
their fellow worshipers absent; but they have my heart and my prayer.
45
 
The entire Mennonite community felt the burden of exile and separation, a burden that 
had ironically been brought about by a war in which they wanted no part. 
 Mennonites in the North empathized with the plight of their southern church 
members.  A report on “Our Brethren in Virginia,” published in November 1864, 
applauded Sheridan for the escort he had provided the unionist refugees but noted, “as 
soon as they had left, all their remaining property, buildings &c., were burned to prevent 
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the rebel army from finding further shelter or sustenance.  One man saw his own 
buildings wrapped in flames before he had left.”  The author—not a victim himself—
commiserated with the refugees,   
It is scarcely possible for us to imagine the feelings of any one as he turns 
his back to his home, under military orders, to seek a home among 
strangers, and as he departs beholds his pathway illuminated by the 
devouring flames that make his home, a heap of smouldering ruins.  
Although it is not supposed that these people will permanently lose 
anything as the government will pay them for all the property they have 
thus destroyed. . . at the present time they are nearly all left in very 
destitute circumstances.
46
   
The Mennonites and Brethren of the Valley discovered that even after the war, the battle 
for restitution of destroyed property was a fight they could not avoid.  Thirty homes in 
Rockingham County were destroyed under Sheridan’s orders, and seventeen residents of 
Dayton proper filed claims with the Southern Claims Commission that heard cases in the 
1870s.  Claimants, though, could only ask restitution for items—mostly livestock, forage, 
and foodstuffs—that members of the regular Union Army confiscated under orders; 
buildings and homes did not qualify.  Furthermore, petitioners had to prove they were 
Unionists, not simply pacifists, and that they had not voted in favor of secession in 1861; 
this stipulation disqualified many claims, as the community had threatened suspected 
Unionists and forced their compliance.   
 Southern newspapers raged against the destruction in the Valley, and many 
compared Dayton to Chambersburg, where over 200 homes had been destroyed by 
Confederate troops in July 1864.  The Lynchburg Virginian asked, “Can these 
counterfeits of humanity—who would include all of our people—the innocent and the 
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guilty—if guilt attach to any—in one common ruin, have any of the milk of human 
kindness in their breasts?”  Even more boldly, the editor asked, “Can any man amongst 
us say now that McCausland burnt a house too many at Chambersburg?”  The article 
concluded with threats of further retaliation, “We hope that when our army again gets 
into Pennsylvania, it will leave a black belt of desolation. . . . We are not responsible for 
the turn the war has taken, and will stand guiltless in the sight of angels and men of the 
excesses to which we may be provoked.”47  The cries of injustice against civilians had 
grown more vociferous over the course of the campaign.  
 The Vindicator, published twenty miles south of Dayton in Staunton, depicted 
Grant and Sheridan as cowards for waging war on defenseless civilians:   
Now Grant, wearied and sick of fighting the veterans of lee with no avail, 
has turned his arms against the women and children of our land, hoping, 
doubtless, that he may gain a glorious victory (!) over them, a result 
already discovered by him impossible to be attained over the former.   
The paper promised that those made destitute by the ruin of their homes and farms would 
have “retribution.”  The author warned, “Let not the North then cry out that Southern 
Barbarians are let loose upon them, but remember that we can point to the campaigns in 
the Valley of the Shenandoah for precedents for all the acts our soldiery may commit and 
a full off set to which will be necessary to make retribution justice.” 48  Each successive 
burning seemed to set off new warnings of impending justice through retaliation. 
 
Surprisingly, some southerners proved unsympathetic to the residents of Dayton.  
One area newspaper that demonstrated the least sympathy for the people of Dayton was 
the Lexington Gazette.  Lexington had itself been the victim of a destructive Union raid in 
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June, yet the editor took perverse pleasure in the destruction sixty miles to the north.  The 
editor wrote, “In the general destruction visited by Sheridan, upon the farmers of the 
Valley, a crumb of comfort is afforded in the fact, that a few of them belonged to 
individuals known as extortioners.  Some portion of this number happened to consist of 
prudent, pacific, and close-fisted Dutchmen.”49  The Lexington paper echoed the 
sentiments expressed by the Rockingham paper weeks that accused Mennonites of 
overcharging for foodstuffs.  The Lynchburg Virginian did not go quite so far as to 
celebrate the religious objectors’ loss, but it did note, “Several of the lower class of 
citizens from Harrisonburg and vicinity migrated with the Yankees, together with most of 
the free negroes in the Valley.  Good citizens rejoice at their departure.”50  Many Valley 
residents who did not belong to the pacifist congregations were relieved at the exodus of 
their Anabaptist neighbors, given the long history of cultural misunderstanding and 
political disagreement within the community.  
  Confederate officers who had supported the destruction of Chambersburg with 
ambivalence were appalled at the general devastation in the northern valley.  Major 
General John B. Gordon expressed dismay over the larger burning campaign in the 
Valley.  In his postwar memoirs, he wrote, “With barns and mills and implements for 
tilling the soil all gone, with cattle, sheep, and every animal that furnished food to the 
helpless inmates carried off, they were dismal abodes of hunger, of hopelessness, and of 
almost measureless woe.”  The destruction was so great that Gordon could not fathom 
that Grant could have ordered Sheridan to carry out the drastic orders.  Gordon 
optimistically—but incorrectly—surmised,  
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It is impossible to believe that it could have been approved by President 
Lincoln, whose entire life, whose every characteristic, was a protest 
against needless oppression and cruelty. . . . I recall no act of General 
Grant in the immediate conduct of his campaigns that would indicate his 
disposition to bring upon any people such sweeping desolation.
51
  
Confederate soldiers saw the burning of the Shenandoah Valley as a new phase of the 
war, one that brought greater levels of destruction than they had previously witnessed. 
 Similarly, Lieutenant Henry Kyd Douglas described Sheridan’s orders to burn 
Dayton as “a holocaust upon [Meigs’] tomb.”  Douglas remained bitter years after the 
war about the destruction he witnessed in the wake of Sheridan’s general orders to 
destroy the Valley’s provisions:  “Did it not occur to either of them [Grant and Sheridan], 
after their smile over the sardonic joke had faded, that the women and children of 
Virginia were more to be pitied than crows, for with no rations to eat at home, they had 
no wings to fly away for food and refuge?”  Douglas poetically described riding “beneath 
great columns of smoke which almost shut out the sun by day, and, in the red glare of 
bonfires, which, all across that Valley, poured out flames and sparks heavenward and 
crackled mockingly in the night air.”  He claimed that he “saw mothers and maidens 
tearing their hair and shrieking to Heaven in their fright and despair, and little children, 
voiceless and tearless in their pitiable terror.”  Douglas’ descriptions of the destruction 
match the flowery, perhaps exaggerated, language of many postwar memoirs, and he 
claimed to record his own memories because “General Grant in his Memoirs passes over 
this work as if he could not bear to touch it, and. . . no reputable historian of the North 
has ventured to tell the truth about it and defend it, for it is an insult to civilization and to 
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God to pretend that the Laws of War justify such warfare.”52  Douglas was correct in his 
assertion that Grant did not discuss the destruction of the Valley in his memoirs, but why 
he did not is unknown.  Grant was in Petersburg at the time, and his Memoirs generally 
focused on his personal experiences.   
Douglas’ fellow Confederate officer Major General Thomas L. Rosser followed 
Sheridan’s path of destruction in early September, before Meigs’ death.  His memoirs 
paint a scene of unimaginable destruction, “The barns, mills, stacks of wheat, oats, 
shocks of corn and in many instances the dwelling houses, wherein were sheltered only 
defenseless women and little children, had all been set on fire by the order of the 
commander of the Federal troops.”  When Rosser’s men engaged the enemy, the battle 
became personal because, Rosser explained, “It was the homes of the men of my brigade 
that were being given to the flames by Sheridan, and the fierceness of their attack [on the 
enemy] showed me the bitterness of their hatred of the wretches who were thus 
destroying their homes.”  Rosser blamed Sheridan alone for the devastation, noting that 
the Union prisoners he captured “were brave, good men and were blameless. . . for they 
only did as they were ordered.  Every prisoner seemed heartily ashamed that such 
cowardly means had been employed in the endeavor to crush a brave people who never 
declined battle.”53  Like Douglas, Rosser’s postwar account aimed partly to justify what 
would come to be known as the “Lost Cause” of the Confederacy and his own role in the 
war.  Regardless, the details provided by Douglas and Rosser do not appreciably 
contradict Union soldiers’ accounts. 
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 One corroborating account came from Union diarist Wilbur Fisk, who served in 
Rockingham County that fateful autumn as a private in the 2
nd
 Vermont Volunteers.  His 
October 4
th
 diary entry noted the effects of war on the civilian population, describing 
Harrisonburg as “a pretty place once. . . but now, like almost all of these Southern cities 
and villages, bearing abundant evidence of the paralyzing effect of war.”  He surmised 
that hard war was breaking the southern will to continue fighting, “Many. . . are heartily 
praying for peace, let it come in what way it will.  They have tasted the bitter fruit of 
secession, and have had enough of it.”  Fisk predicted that southern suffering would soon 
bring an end to the conflict, “They see the grim determination of the North and they 
begin to feel that to hold out longer is to fight against the inevitable destiny.”54  Fisk’s 
conclusions differed wildly from those of the local newspapers that promised continued 
retaliation for the destruction. 
 Union Army surgeon Alexander Neil echoed Fisk’s belief that hard war achieved 
peace.  Writing to his parents from Harrisonburg on October 5, he reported, “We are 
burning and destroying everything in this valley, such as wheat stacks, hay stacks, barns, 
houses.  Indeed, there will be nothing but heaps of ashes and ruins generally between 
Staunton and Harper’s Ferry.”  He also noted, “Thousands of Refugees are fleeing north 
daily, as nothing but starvation would stare them in the face to stay in this valley the 
coming winter.  They express themselves as heartily tired of the war and now fully 
realize that Secession has been a dear thing to them.”55  Neil may have reported the 
refugees’ feelings accurately, but many of those who left were Unionists and had never 
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enthusiastically supported the war or secession.  Gauging the wider community’s will to 
continue fighting is a far more difficult task that continues to be debated by historians 
studying Confederate nationalism. 
 Sheridan’s report to Grant on October 7 tallied the damages his army had inflicted 
so far in the entire Shenandoah Valley, not just Rockingham County:  We have destroyed 
“over 2,000 barns, filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over 70 mills, filled 
with flour and wheat. . . over 4[,000] head of stock. . . not less than 3,000 sheep.”  He 
concluded that “the whole country from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountains has been 
made untenable for a rebel army.”  Sheridan, like the Union soldiers who served under 
him, also believed that the devastation had weakened southern resistance.  He wrote to 
Grant, “The people here are getting sick of the war; heretofore they have had no reason to 
complain, because they have been living in great abundance.”56  On October 9, Early 
submitted a remarkably similar report to Lee, “[Sheridan] has laid waste nearly all of 
Rockingham and Shenandoah [counties], and I will have to rely on Augusta [County] for 
my supplies, and they are not abundant there.  Sheridan’s purpose, under Grant’s orders, 
has been to render the Valley untenable by our troops by destroying the supplies.”57  
Sheridan had not only demolished Early’s provisions; he had also introduced civilians in 
the Shenandoah Valley to hard war and its devastating results. 
 The effects of Sheridan’s march through the Valley lasted far beyond the war 
itself.  Nearly three years after the burning of Dayton, a Pennsylvania Mennonite made 
his first visit to the Shenandoah Valley.  His remarks are telling,  
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The marks of the war are yet plainly to be seen in the valley.  The ruins of 
houses, barns, bridges, and fences, are numerous.  The loss of property, 
the care, the anxiety, the temptation, and in a few cases the persecutions 
which our friends here suffered, cannot be fully realized by those who did 
not live amid the scenes of battle, destruction, waste, bloodshed, and 
death. . . . But the war-cloud is gone, peace has dawned, and a promising 
harvest bespeaks the care and the goodness of the God of peace and love.
58
 
Recovery would be a slow process for the people of Dayton, but it would come.  Far 
more than Lexington, or even Chambersburg, farmers in southern Rockingham County 
had lived the horrors of war and experienced hard war.  The long encampment of Union 
forces, combined with the nearly incessant foraging of Confederate troops had taken its 
toll on the community, and it would be a long while before life returned to normal. 
 As for the soldiers who had to carry out the burning, most expressed sincere 
regret at the orders they had received.  Chaplain Beaudry questioned the destructive 
policy altogether,  
Such a duty, I hope, our Regiment will never have to perform again.  The 
influence on the Command is very demoralizing.  It seems to me that the 
ultimate result of such a burning on our cause, must be very doubtful.  It 
will exasperate some, inciting them to deeds of grater barbarity, while it 
will intimidate others, but it is difficult to determine now, where will be 
the preponderance. . . . We have read of the horror of ‘Fire & Sword,’ but 
we never saw on this vice before and we will never know what that 
means.
59
 
Union soldiers in the Army of the Shenandoah would not have to wield “the fire and 
sword” again in the war, but just as they completed their distasteful duties in Virginia, 
General William T. Sherman and his Military Division of the Mississippi were about to 
ravage the Georgia landscape in a campaign that would overshadow Sheridan’s 
“burning” of the Shenandoah Valley.  Beaudry may have been correct in his estimation 
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that such conduct was “demoralizing,” but it also proved effective in curtailing the 
enemy’s ability to wage war.  The war would be over six months after the Valley 
Campaign of 1864 ended. 
 As for the heroes of Dayton—the 116th Ohio—they simply wanted to be 
remembered for their humanitarian service to the people whose homes they helped save.  
Wildes’ ghostwriter contemplated the unit’s contributions after the war, “The people of 
Dayton anyhow, if of no other place in the South, believed there were at least some 
Yankees who had some humanity in them. . . . If a 116
th
 Ohio man ever happens in 
Dayton, he may depend upon a warm reception.  At least he ought to have one.”60  And 
indeed, almost one hundred fifty years after Dayton was saved by Colonel Wildes and the 
men of the 116
th
 Ohio, a small monument in the town still memorializes the brave officer 
and his plea to Sheridan that saved their town.  The monument reads,  
In memory of Lt. Col. Thomas F. Wiles, 116
th
 Ohio Regiment, who, when 
ordered by Gen. Sheridan to burn the town of Dayton, Va. in retaliation 
for the death of a Union officer, refused to obey that order, risking court-
martial and disgrace.  His refusal and plea to Gen. Sheridan resulted in a 
countermand to the order, and saved this town from total destruction. 
The monument in Dayton serves not only as a memorial to Wildes, but to the use of 
restraint in hard war as well.  
                                               
60
 Wildes, 192.   
  
 
 
Conclusion 
The Second Shenandoah Valley Campaign in 1864 created new challenges for 
commanders, soldiers, and civilians on both sides.  Pressure on General Grant and 
President Lincoln to end the war quickly precipitated an increase in the use and severity 
of hard war policies in the South.  Meanwhile, Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal 
Early worked against his foe, implementing hard war in southern Pennsylvania in a 
desperate attempt to maintain his supply base in the Shenandoah Valley.  Soldiers and 
civilians found themselves caught in the middle of an increasing cycle of destruction that 
they seemed to find equally demoralizing. 
 Hunter’s Raid in June signaled the opening volley of destruction in the campaign.  
General Hunter exercised great restraint in Lexington, selecting three homes—only one 
of which was privately owned—to be destroyed.  He allowed the professors’ families to 
remove their personal effects and actively protected the home of John Letcher’s mother 
from catching fire as the former governor’s residence burned next door.  Hunter could not 
have allowed Virginia Military Institute to remain untouched following the school’s role 
in defeating the Union Army at New Market, but he also neglected to burn it completely 
to the ground.  Likewise, he spared nearby Washington College from destruction when he 
could have consigned it to the same fate as VMI.  Hunter acted cautiously in Lexington, 
spending the night in the town before ordering the destruction of any buildings, and his 
men carefully noted which properties were destroyed and why in their letters and diaries.  
Yet, in the early stages of the campaign, civilians expressed outrage at the deliberate 
destruction of a handful of private homes in Lexington, Virginia and Jefferson County, 
West Virginia.  They found, however, that they could justify this limited destruction since 
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it targeted specific individuals with particular ties to the Confederacy.  Even the 
destruction of VMI provoked little dismay or surprise. 
 The burning of Chambersburg six weeks later may have been a foolhardy attempt 
to compensate for financial losses in Virginia, but it succeeded in ramping up the level of 
destruction in the overall campaign.  When Brigadier General John McCausland rode in 
with orders to collect a ransom or burn the town, many people felt that the line of 
civilized warfare had been crossed.  McCausland—and Early, through him—did not 
distinguish among which homes would be spared or torched.  Grant’s letters prior to 
McCausland’s Raid on July 30 clearly indicate that he planned to destroy Confederate 
supplies in the Shenandoah Valley before the burning of Chambersburg, but civilians and 
soldiers alike felt that Early’s orders to burn private residences indiscriminately had let 
the proverbial genie out of the bottle.  Fears swirled on both sides of the Mason-Dixon 
Line that the scene in Chambersburg would be repeated ad infinitum throughout the 
eastern theater of the war. 
 Chambersburg did not cause the widespread implementation of hard war 
throughout the Shenandoah Valley, but it did persuade Grant to begin the process 
immediately.  General Philip H. Sheridan’s appointment over the Middle Military 
Division signaled the beginning of the destruction there in August 1864.  After Union 
troops spent much of August and September destroying barns, haystacks, and livestock, 
the controversial death of Lieutenant John Meigs in Dayton provoked the order to burn 
houses in a prescribed area, regardless of the owners’ identities.  This time, though, 
Union soldiers raised the outcry and convinced Sheridan to spare the homes of Unionists 
in the community by rescinding the order.  Still, the overall destruction caused by 
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Sheridan’s troops was far more extensive than the previous instances.  Civilians whose 
homes survived often lost their entire harvest and all of their livestock.  Unlike 
Chambersburg, residents of Rockingham County had no near neighbors with a surplus to 
share, and many simply chose to leave. 
 In each town that summer and fall of 1864, the commanders and enlisted men 
exercised restraint in the destruction.  Often, men from both sides had been involved in or 
witnessed more than one of these raids on civilians.  In Lexington, only specific homes 
were targeted.  In Chambersburg, the destruction may have seemed complete, but only 
the center of town was destroyed, and some soldiers took it upon themselves to spare 
individual homes.  By October, soldiers who had already participated in Hunter’s Raid or 
witnessed the aftermath of McCausland’s Raid still did not relish the prospect of 
destroying homes, and many found excuses not to destroy property, even beyond 
Sheridan’s change in orders.  Sheridan himself extended mercy to Unionist refugees, 
providing hundreds of wagons to take them and their belongings North.   
 To say that the level of destruction steadily increased from June to October would 
be an oversimplification.  Yet the destruction did seem to become less discriminate and 
more widespread as the campaign progressed.  Concurrently, the level of distress soldiers 
and civilians expressed also increased with each incident, prompting soldiers to go to new 
lengths to circumvent orders to spare private property.  Each instance was sparked by 
some sentiment of retaliation.  And in every instance, without fail, the men and civilians 
caught in the middle expressed profound regret.  Both sides decided that hard war had 
limits.  
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